Call for Advertisements: Showcase Your Brand in the Historic BNLF 25th Anniversary Publication

by Legalnaija | Jun 9, 2026 | Uncategorized

Essential Books for Election Petition Lawyers in Nigeria

by Legalnaija | Apr 6, 2026 | Uncategorized

Election petition practice is one of the most specialised, high-pressure, and time-sensitive areas of Nigerian law. With strict timelines, unique procedural rules, and politically charged environments, only lawyers who are thoroughly prepared can effectively represent their clients before election tribunals and appellate courts.

Legalnaija’s bookstore stocks some of the most comprehensive references available in Nigeria on election petition law — from procedural guides to detailed arguments on tribunal competence and the admissibility of electronic evidence.

Why Specialised Resources Matter

Election petition proceedings operate under a distinct legal framework — governed by the Electoral Act, the Constitution, and a body of case law that evolves with each election cycle. A litigator who enters this space relying only on general civil procedure texts is at a significant disadvantage.

These books are written by practitioners who have been in the trenches of Nigerian electoral disputes. They reflect hard-won insights that you simply will not find elsewhere.

Books We Recommend

• Challenging Competence of Tribunals and Courts and Validity of Judgements and Orders in Election Petition Proceedings —  ₦80,000
• Arguments in Election Petition Appeals Volume I and 2 —  ₦90,000
• Arguments on Witness Statements, Forensic Expert Reports and Technicalities in Election Petition Proceedings —  ₦80,000

These are investment-grade texts — the kind that pay dividends when you are before a tribunal arguing jurisdictional competence, challenging witness statements, or navigating the appeal process. If you practise in this space, or intend to, these books are non-negotiable.

🛒 Browse and order at: www.legalnaija.com/store

Register Now: Art Law Training Session For Artist And Lawyers

by Legalnaija | Apr 2, 2026 | Uncategorized

The art world is full of creativity, but it’s also full of contracts, copyrights, and complex legal rules that can make or break an artist’s career. Too many talented artists lose money, ownership, and opportunities simply because they don’t understand the laws that govern their work. This course is designed to change that. Over four weeks, you’ll gain the legal clarity and business confidence every artist needs to thrive. From mastering copyright and contracts to navigating NFTs, online sales, and gallery representation, you’ll learn how to safeguard your art, negotiate from a position of strength, and build a sustainable business around your creativity.

Whether you’re a painter, sculptor, photographer, digital creator, NFT innovator, or Lawyer looking to learn more about Art Law, this program equips you with practical tools, templates, and strategies to protect your rights and maximize your value. By the end, you won’t just be making art—you’ll be running a structured, wealth-building art business with confidence.

Are you ready to stop leaving money and rights on the table? This 4-week intensive gives you the legal clarity every artist needs to thrive.

For ease of reference, please find other information about the training below;

Theme: Art Law for Artists: Protect Your Work. Structure Your Business. Build Wealth

Date: May 10, 17, 24, 31

Time: 5pm each day

Venue: Virtual

Course Outline:

WEEK 1: Understanding Art Law & Your Rights

WEEK 2: Contracts Every Artist Must Have

WEEK 3: Authenticity, Provenance & Avoiding Fakes

WEEK 4: Structuring Your Art Business

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• Standard ₦80,000
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This is more than a course—it’s your legal toolkit and pathway to long-term success in the art world.

The Law as an Ass? A Critique of  Lucky v. State on Rape Sentencing’ | By Isah Bala Garba.

by Legalnaija | Jan 4, 2026 | Uncategorized

They do say the law is an ass, but should it be so?

Can a trial court judge rewrite the law on rape sentence?

This girl’s name was Iruoghene Ogodo, an 11-year-old, and the Appellant was Mr. Afor Lucky, on 7th April 2012 he sent her to buy ‘pure water’ (sachet water) for him, thereafter he lured her into his room and forcibly had sex with her. An innocent child; bleeding from a torn hymen and injured vaginal wall, as confirmed by PW3 (the chief medical officer). a girl at that age can’t, in our criminal corpus juris, give consent, as ordained in section 30 of the Criminal Code and a similar provision in section 39 of the Penal Code.

Mr Lucky was charged and arraigned at the Delta State High Court on one count charge of rape under section 358 of the criminal code Law of Delta state, 2006. He didn’t deem it appropriate to plead guilty in order to expedite the proceeding, perhaps he felt he could get away with it. So he pleaded not guilty of course, like almost every defendant, and even raised alibi (claiming he wasn’t even there on 7th April 2012). Prosecution called Four Witnesses proving forceful penetration; PW3 satured the Virginal wall injury, ruling out other causes like bicycle riding as sheepishly claimed by the defendant to be a cause among the causes of virginal injury, he counter called two witnesses to establish his innocence. At this point, some questions are certainly inevitable. Would a trial judge, faced with such barbaric evidence against an 11-year-old, impose 5 years imprisonment with hard labor OR N300,000 fine? A girl that in law cannot give consent?After plea of allocutus, can mitigation rewrite life imprisonment under section 358 to 5 years imprisonment?

This is what happened in the case of LUCKY V. STATE (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1528) 128.

The Delta State High Court, found him guilty as charged. After the plea of allocutus seeking for mitigation of his sentence, he was consequently given a sham sentence of 5 years with hard labour or N300,000 fine instead of life imprisonment. And the question was: does the trial judge actually rewrite the law? Because section 358 of the Criminal Code Law of Delta State, 2006, under which he was charged, provides for life imprisonment. What was his plea of allocutus about to warrant such mitigation? And if they were so compelling, can it be just to the victim and even de jure for them to be considered in such a magnitude offense? After all, justice is a three-way traffic.

Surprisingly, Mr Lucky protested, he was unhappy with even that leniency, and appeal to court of Appeal on 17th November 2014, the appeal was dismissed. The learned wise men called it ridiculous, however, they said their hands were tied since state didn’t cross-appeal, as such can’t temper with the sentence. Supreme Court in 2016 also affirmed the conviction; lamented the ‘contumacious violation’ of law, but resisted tampering with the sentence since no appeal was made against it by the state. Justices like Ngwuta, Okoro, Galadima JCS called it mockery, attack on justice, yet law is an ass.

I have read the case before, when I wrote my article titled: ‘Is the plea of Allocutus a right or a privilege in Nigerian criminal proceedings?’ but not meticulously like this. Upon reading it again today, I am not in total agreement with the decisions of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court that they can’t temper with the sentence in the absence of the appeal. Can they really not invoke powers under sections 16 & 22 Court of Appeal Act and Supreme Court Act respectively to correct the error? I read the case over and over, erudite justices in pain, quoting Nafiu Rabiu v. State, but where then did they get the restraint from?On rape punishment? Section 358 provides: ‘any person who commits the offence of rape is liable to IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE.’ No discretion, no option of fine.The above provision is clear and unambiguous, life for rape. In this case, where then did the trial court get 5 years from? Of course, I am not unaware of the position that pursuant to section 311 of ACJA (2015) Judges are enjoined to consider mitigating factors while sentencing, but can the said power be exercised in the offense of this magnitude considering even the circumstances of this case? Or should we safely say courts upheld an ass?

In my humble view, both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court could have invoked their general powers pursuant to sections 16 and 22 of the Court of Appeal Act and Supreme Court Act respectively to correct the error. The sections respectively give them jurisdiction of the court of first instance; that’s to act as if the case was initiated or prosecuted before them to correct or amend, inter alia, errors; specifically this case being errors of law, awherend any other order the lower court could have made. This enormous power was given judicial recognition and duly applied in the celebrated case of Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 427, per Niki Tobi, JSC( as he then was) who delivered the lead judgment,affirmed the act of the trial court in granting reliefs sought in the substantive matter even though those reliefs were not part of the grounds of appeal before the Court. The case reached the Court of Appeal by way of an interlocutory appeal, solely to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Upon resolving that issue in the affirmative, the Court of Appeal refused to remit the case back to the trial court and proceeded to determine the substantive suit, relying on section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act. This approach was endorsed by Niki Tobi, JSC, and the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, with the exception of Oguntade, JSC,(As he then was) who dissented.

For emphasis, section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act provides as follows:

‘The Court of Appeal may, from time to time, MAKE ANY ORDER NECESSARY FOR DETERMINING THE REAL QUESTION IN CONTROVERSY in the appeal, and may AMEND ANY DEFECT OR ERROR in the record of appeal, and may DIRECT the court below to inquire into and certify its findings on any question which the Court of Appeal thinks fit to determine before final judgment in the appeal and may MAKE AN INTERIM ORDER or grant any injunction which the court below is authorised to make or grant and may DIRECT ANY NECESSARY INQUIRIES or accounts to be made or taken and GENERALLY SHALL HAVE FULL JURISDICTION OVER THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS AS IF THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN INSTITUTED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL AS COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE and may RE-HEAR THE CASE in whole or in part or may REMIT it to the court below for the purpose of such re-hearing or may GIVE SUCH OTHER DIRECTIONS as to the manner in which the court below shall deal with the case in accordance with the powers of that court, or, in the case of an appeal from the court below in that court’s appellate jurisdiction, ORDER THE CASE TO BE RE-HEARD by a court of competent jurisdiction.’[Capitalizations mine,for emphasis]

 Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act contains similar and equally expansive provisions, empowering the Supreme Court to exercise the jurisdiction of a court of first instance where justice so demands. So no harm will be done if I refuse to qoute it.

Hey, you, yes you!Hold back your dagger, I am merely saying this in the light of the wordings of the sections and the judicial pronouncement. I hope I am right. It wouldn’t be terrible even if I am wrong, but I believe the courts could have fallen back to the provisions to ensure the ungodly and ungrateful perpetrator of the heinous act faces the wrath of the law accordingly. And on that; I say no more.

Isah Bala Garba is a level 300 student from Faculty of Law, Bayero University, Kano. He can be reached for comments or corrections on: LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/isah-bala-garba-301983276 Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/isah.bala.garba

isahbalagarba05@gmail.com or on 08100129131

The Practical Training Academy Ltd/Gte (TPTA) Delivers Comprehensive Public Law Office Training for Cross River State Ministry of Justice

by Legalnaija | Dec 5, 2025 | Uncategorized

Sections 174 (1) and 211 (1) of the Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended: A working tool against any person accused of crime in Nigeria? | Mohammed Yahaya Pichiko

by Legalnaija | Dec 3, 2025 | Uncategorized

INTRODUCTION:

The power of prosecution is constitutionally vested in the Attorney-General of the Federation and the Attorney-General of each state, but it can also be exercised by other agencies and individuals like the police and private legal practitioners, subject to the Attorney-General’s authority. This power involves the discretion to commence, continue, or discontinue any criminal proceeding, which must be exercised fairly, independently, and in the public interest, the Attorney-General holds the ultimate power to prosecute, discontinue, or take over any criminal case. The Attorney-General can delegate this authority to other officers within their ministry or to legal practitioners.The police and other bodies can also prosecute cases, but this power is subordinate to the Attorney-General’s overriding authority and must be exercised within legal boundaries, while the police have prosecutorial powers, they are subject to the Attorney-General’s control, for higher courts, police officers must be qualified legal practitioners. Prosecutors have broad discretion, including the power to choose the charge, decide whether to prosecute or not, and pursue plea bargains. The exercise of prosecutorial power is subject to judicial review to ensure fairness and adherence to the rule of law, a prosecutor must consider the public interest when deciding whether to prosecute, even if there is sufficient evidence of a crime. References to the case of Akpa V. State (2008)LPELR-368(SC)

Brief Fact of the case contain as follows:

The case of the prosecution is that the deceased, Ikechukwu Njoku, visited the appellant at Jibia and never returned. He was murdered by the appellant. At the scene of crime, police recovered a human body without legs, arms and neck. In the inner room of the appellant’s shop, police found the floor of the room and a mattress soaked with blood. They also found blood stain by the hole of the pit latrine attached to the inner room. When the pit latrine was dug open they saw two human legs. Appellant was arrested for murdering Ikechukwu Njoku on or about 3rd of December, 1989. The learned trial Judge found the appellant guilty of culpable homicide punishable with death and sentenced him to death. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed, further appeal to the Supreme Court.

ANALYSIS vis a vis DECISION OF THE CASE:

The Supreme Court, per NIKI TOBI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment), upheld both the judgment of trial and lower courts by dismissing the appeal of the appellant emphasizing on the power of the Prosecution to prosecute vis a vis power of the court to prosecute a person,  the court held that the prosecution has an unfettered discretion to prosecute persons in Court because the discretion is unfettered, Courts of law do not have the power to question it. The only jurisdiction of the Court is to try accused persons presented before it for prosecution. A Court cannot go outside the prosecution and ask for some other person to be charged before it.

The mere fact that an accused person specifically mentioned other persons in his statement to the police in the chain of criminality or criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the persons are in fact guilty of the offence or must as a matter of law be charged to Court. And what is more, I know of no law which says that because other persons who committed an offence are not charged to Court, the accused person charged to Court must, on that ground, be discharged and acquitted. Criminal liability is personal. It cannot be transferred. This is because the mens rea or actus reus is on the accused in Court and cannot be transferred to any other person not charged. By way of recapitulation, I should say that the prosecution is not under any regimental duty or any duty at all, to charge all possible accused persons. I should perhaps mention here the practice where the prosecution, instead of charging a particular suspect, decides to call him as a witness, to ensure the conviction of a particular accused person or particular accused persons.

However, in other hand their are  circumstances in which the order of mandamus is directed to an individual, body, tribunal or inferior court requiring the performance of some specified thing in the nature of a public duty appertaining to his office. The performance of the duty need not involve a judicial function.” References to the famous case of  Fawehenmi V. Halilu Akilu (1987) SC

Brief fact of the case of Fawehenmi V. Halilu Akilu (supra)

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The facts of this case was that on Sunday, the 19th October 1986, Mr. Dele Giwa, a Journalist and Editor-In-Chief of a weekly magazine, NEWSWATCH, was killed in his residence at Ikeja in Lagos State by a parcel bomb. On the 3rd of November, 1986, the Appellant, a friend and legal adviser to Mr. Dele Giwa (deceased) submitted to the respondent a 39 page documentation containing all details of the investigation he conducted together with an information accusing two army officers of the murder of Dele Giwa. The two army officers are: Col. Halilu Akilu, the Director of Military Intelligence and Lt. Col. A.K. Togun, Deputy Director of the State Security Service. Pursuant to Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State, the applicant acting as a private prosecutor requested the Respondent as Director of Public Prosecutions, Lagos State to exercise his discretion whether or not, he would prosecute Col. Akilu and Lt. Col. A.K. Togun for the murder of Mr. Dele Giwa and if he declines to prosecute, to endorse a certificate to that effect on the information submitted to him by the applicant/Appellant. This is to enable the applicant/Appellant to prosecute Col. Halilu Akilu and Lt. Col. A.K. Togun for the murder.

Subsequently, the Appellant met the Respondent in the Respondent’s office, as he could not meet the Respondent on Wednesday the 5th of November 1986. The Respondent informed him that he could not come to a decision whether or not to prosecute Col Halilu Akilu and Lt.Col A.K. Togun for the murder of Mr. Dele Giwa until he received a Police Report of Police Investigation. The Appellant filed an application in the High Court of Lagos State for leave to apply for an Order of Mandamus to compel the Respondent to decide whether or not to prosecute these two accused persons and if he decides not to prosecute, to endorse the information that he has seen the information but he had decided not to prosecute at public instance.  The learned trial Judge dismissed the application. The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed his Appeal on the ground that the Appellant has no Locus Standi in the death of Dele Giwa to bring the Application he has brought. Secondly, the Court of Appeal held that the Chief Judge of Lagos State was right in refusing appellant’s leave on the limited materials before him. The two Courts i.e. the High Court and the Court of Appeal held that the Appellant’s application was hopeless. frivolous, improper, ill-timed, hasty and pre-mature. The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Court of Appeal.

From the above fact of this case it’s extremely clear that where prosecution failure to prosecute a person, a court of law can compel the prosecution for a specific performance in other to grant an individual or private individual power of fiat to  prosecute such matter by way of applying or seeking the leave of the court to grant an order of mandamus.

ANALYSIS vis a vis DECISION OF THE CASE OF FAWEHENMI V HALILU AKILU (supra)

ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI, J.S.C.(Delivering the Leading Judgement): This appeal raises two important questions which will continue to be debated in legal circles for a long time. The 1st question touches the locus standi of the appellant to initiate and institute these proceedings in the High Court. In other words, has the appellant established his locus standi entitling him to seek leave of the High Court to apply for an order of mandamus? The second question concerns the quantum or sufficiency of the facts deposed to and placed before the High Court in an application of this sort.

The law has being settled by vesting power on the Attorney-General to grant a fiat to an individual who so wish to  prosecute their case personally, failure of the Attorney-General to grant such fiat will avail such an individual to  seek the leave of the court for an order of mandamus to enable personal prosecution (individual) have the locus standi in which the court can compel a body or public prosecution to appertaining it office responsibility. References to CBN V. SYSTEM APPLICATION PRODUCTS (NIG) LTD (2004) LPELR-5432(CA)

The order of mandamus requested by a party is among the prerogative orders which are discretionary common law remedies which a High Court may grant in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior Courts and Tribunal and control of governmental duties and powers. It is a public law remedy and is directed against officers in their capacity as such or against public bodies such as the CBN, A.G PSC and other government parastatals. It aims at compelling the performance of a public duty in which the person applying for it has sufficient legal interest. In the case of Shitta-Bay v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40, cited by the learned trial Judge, Idigbe, JSC, said – “The order of mandamus, of course, only issues to a person or corporation, requiring him or them to do same particular thing therein specified, which appertains to his or their office, and is in the nature of a public duty.” The case of the Queen v. Western Urhobo Rating Authority and Ors Ex-Parte Odje and Ors (1961) All NLR 796, a public duty to do the act in question, has been held to be one that must be imposed upon the person against whom the order is sought. In Fawehinmi v. Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 797, it was held that the proposed recipient of an order of mandamus must be an individual body, or Tribunal, or Inferior Court with a public duty to the applicant. And, finally, such public duty need not to be imposed by statute only. It may be a duty under the common law, and even duty under customary law is enforceable by an order of mandamus. See: Layanju v. Araoye (1961) 1 All NLR 83, (1959) 4 FSC 154 at 157; The Queen (Ex-Parte Ekpenga v. Ozogula II (1962) 1 All NLR 796. It must be noted however that the person enjoined to perform the act must have failed upon demand to do it. See R v. I.R.C. (1962) 1 SCNLR 423; Re-Nathan (1884) 12 QBD 461.” Per IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD, JCA (Pp 21 – 23 Paras F – C)

In light of the above the prosecution has power to prosecute and tender evidence/exhibits in other for the court to convict the defendant, the defendant can only be convicted where the prosecution have established a prima facie case by linking the act of the defendant to the crime alleged to have being committed or after the close of prosecution case and the defendant file a No Case Submission and it has being overruled by the court and failure of defendant to open a defense in an allegation of criminal offence against him in this circumstances the defendant is exposing himself to risk and gambling that may warrant or land him to have committed such offence before a court of law. References to the case of Adamu V. State (2014)LPELR-22696 (SC),  Ejibade V State (2012)LPELR-15531 (SC). Unreported case of Federal Republic of Nigeria V. Nnamdi Kanu FHC/ABJ/CR/383/2015

Attorney-General’s Constitutional Power

The power to prosecute is established in Nigeria’s Constitution 1999 as amended. Section 174 grants this power to the Attorney-General of the Federation, and Section 211 grants it to the Attorneys-General of the states.

(a) This authority includes the power to commence, continue, and discontinue any criminal proceedings.

(b) The Attorney-General can exercise this power personally or through officers in their ministry or department.

Delegation and Limitations

(a) The Attorney-General can authorize others to prosecute, such as the police or other legal practitioners.

(b) The police have a statutory role in prosecution but are ultimately subject to the Attorney-General’s overriding authority.

(c) While private citizens can be empowered by law to lay a complaint, they cannot prosecute that complaint in court without the Attorney-General’s explicit authorization or “fiat”.

Discretionary Power

(a) The Attorney-General has broad discretion in exercising this power.

(b)This discretion can be used to decide which charges to file and what plea deals to offer, potentially impacting the outcome of a case.

(c) The Attorney-General has discretion include the power to enter a nolle prosequi, which discontinues a prosecution without a formal acquittal.

From the above analysis it’s obvious that both parties, that the Attorney General of either a State or the Federation has unfettered discretion power  to either prosecute or discontinue prosecution of a criminal case against any person. The discretion of the Attorney General can be exercised by him in person or through officers of his department and once the power or discretion has been properly exercised no one can question it, including the Courts. See Section 174 (1) – (3) and Section 211 (1) – (3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), references to the following cases: AUDU V. A.G. FED. (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 175, STATE V. ILORI & 2 ORS. (1983) 2 SC 155, ALHAJI ATTA V. C.O.P. (2003)5 F.R. 186, SHIDALI V. F.R.N. (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 421) 899, ABACHA V. STATE (2002) 11 NSCQR 345 at 381, FRN V. OSAHON (2006)25 NSCQR 512.” Per ADAMU JAURO, JCA (Pp 12 – 12 Paras A – E)

The Supreme Court of Nigeria in the famous case of STATE V. ISIJOLA (2023) LPELR-59935(SC), Per MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC (Pp 15 – 16 Paras D – A) In a dissenting opinion that:

“Whether a person can be tried by a High Court where no charge has been filed/preferred against him“

“Section 185 (b) of the CPC, Cap 35, Laws of Niger State of Nigeria (Revised Edition) 1989 pursuant to which the application was made and granted, simply provides that: “185. No person shall be tried by the High Court unless:- (b) a charge is prepared against him without the holding of a preliminary inquiry by leave of a Judge of the High Court.” Briefly, these provisions prescribe that the trial High Court shall not try any person unless a charge is preferred or filed against him in that Court with the leave of a Judge thereof.”

It’s from the above judicial authority which this article center on which I also derive my opinion that their is no any court of law in Nigeria that can either compel the prosecution neither the court itself prosecute a person without no  any charge filed/preferred against a person before a court of law as such any party who front load an originating process seeking an order of mandamus or certiorari to compel the prosecution to prosecute a person which is not initiatiated by the prosecution itself such matter instituted against prosecution is dead on arrival, because the choice of who to prosecute is exclusively that of prosecution. References to the case of GOLIT V. IGP (2018) LPELR-46188(CA).

Furthermore, “the law is now fully settled that a Court cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s right to file a charge nor can it prevent the EFCC from initiating a charge or information against any person in the Federal High Court, High Court of a State or the FCT High Court once the matter or criminal proceedings has to do with economic or financial crimes and there is a law in place whether under Act of National Assembly or law of a state for instance criminal code law or Penal Code Law criminalizing the crimes or offences for which the Defendant is arraigned or charged within a State High Court. References to the famous case of ALIYU V. F.R.N. & ORS (2020) LPELR-50517(CA) and also see ISIAKA MUMINI V. FRN (2018) 11 SCM 127 at 137 – 138 A – B per EKO JSC who said: “I think it has to be borne in mind that the choice of the charge to prefer against the accused person on a given set of facts is the prerogative of the prosecutor. Neither the Court nor the accused person can interfere with the prerogative of the prosecutor in this regard. From a line of cases, including Yongo V. Commissioner of Police (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 257) 36; Alake V. The State (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 260: Chima Ijioffor V. The State (2001) 4 SC (pt. 11) 1; (2001) NWLR (Pt. 718) 371, the Courts recognize and respect this prerogative of the prosecutor to prefer any charge from the facts at his disposal. Thus as Achike, JSC, Stated in IJIOFFOR V. THE STATE (supra) the prosecutor’s – Prosecutorial responsibility is to establish his case beyond reasonable doubt in order to secure the conviction of the (accused person). How he gets about discharging this is entirely his business. Under no circumstance will the accused person dictate to the prosecution what charge shall be preferred or what witnesses shall be fielded against him in discharge of the prosecutor’s prosecutorial responsibilities.” Per PETER OLABISI IGE, JCA (Pp 46 – 47 Paras D – F)

Conclusion:

The law is clear that the power of prosecution is constitutionally vested on the Attorney General of the Federation and the Attorneys General of the states, who have the authority to institute, continue, or discontinue criminal proceedings. Other bodies, such as the police, can also prosecute, but their power is subordinate to the Attorney General’s authority and is subject to limitations or restrictions by the Attorney General. Other laws may grant specific agencies concurrent prosecution powers for particular offenses and a particular individual can also prosecute by authorization of fiat.

However, the jurisdiction of a court of law is to entertain criminal proceedings initiated by the prosecution which is apparent in our legal system, court does not in anyway inherit any power to either to compel the prosecution to discharge it duty statutory vested on prosecution though in some circumstances the court can compel the prosecution to grant a fiat to an individual to prosecute their case nor the court doesn’t has power to prosecute a person.

_________________________________________________________________________________

Full Name: MOHAMMED YAHAYA PICHIKO

Email:pichiko321@gmail.com

Number: 07033412386

Hobbies: READING & RESEARCH

Current Positions: DIRECTOR FOR MOOT & MOCK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NIGER STATE LAW STUDENTS’ (NANIGLAWS NHQ) AND CURRENT JUDGE 3 UNION COURT BUK.

From iPhone XR to iPhone 17 Pro Max: Innovation or Infringement? | Optimist Ibukun

by Legalnaija | Oct 27, 2025 | Uncategorized

From iPhone XR to iPhone 17 Pro Max: Innovation or Infringement? The Intellectual Property and Legal Reality of Unauthorized Conversions

Introduction

In recent months, the internet has been flooded with videos and offers showing how an iPhone XR can be “converted” or “upgraded” into the latest iPhone 17 Pro Max—often through software modifications and hardware tweaks. Many of these offers claim to source devices directly from China at a low cost, supposedly helping consumers avoid what they describe as “extortion” from retailers in Nigeria and other countries.

While this trend might seem attractive to consumers seeking the prestige of owning the latest iPhone model without spending millions of naira, the legal implications are far-reaching. Beyond the economic effects on Apple and legitimate retailers, there are serious intellectual property (IP) and consumer protection concerns that must be examined.

This article explores these issues through the lens of Intellectual Property Law—highlighting how such conversions may amount to multiple forms of IP infringement under Nigerian, U.S., Chinese, and international (WIPO) law.

Understanding Intellectual Property Protection in iPhone 17 Pro Max

Intellectual Property Law exists primarily to protect the economic and moral rights of creators and innovators. Apple Inc. is one of the world’s most active IP holders, securing comprehensive protection for every new product before launch.

The iPhone 17 Pro Max is protected under several categories of IP:

1. Trademark Protection

Apple’s trademarks protect identifiers such as:

a. The name “iPhone”, “iPhone 17 Pro Max”, and Apple’s bitten apple logo.

b. Taglines such as “Ceramic Shield” or “Fusion Camera”.

These are registered marks globally under the Madrid Protocol (administered by WIPO), and also locally in the United States, China, and Nigeria (under the Trademarks Act, Cap T13, LFN 2004).

2. Copyright Protection

Apple’s iOS 18/19/26 operating system, interface icons, sounds, animations, and even wallpapers are protected under copyright law as original literary and artistic works.

Reproducing or modifying these without authorization violates:

a. Section 15 of the Nigerian Copyright Act 2022,

b. Title 17 of the U.S. Code (Copyright Act), and

c. China’s Copyright Law (2020 Amendment).

3. Industrial Design Rights

The shape, finish, and camera layout (“camera plateau”) of the iPhone 17 Pro Max are protected by industrial design rights, covering the non-functional aesthetic features.
Under Part II of the Nigerian Patents and Designs Act, and China’s Patent Law (Design Patent provisions), copying these features without permission constitutes design infringement.

Apple’s proprietary technologies—such as the A19 Pro chip architecture, camera sensors, and image processing pipelines—are likely covered by utility patents. These patents prevent unauthorized use, reproduction, or reverse-engineering of Apple’s technology.

4. Trade Secrets

Apple also protects certain confidential elements—such as camera algorithms, optical systems, and noise-reduction software—under trade secret laws, notably under the U.S. Defend Trade Secrets Act (2016) and similar provisions in Chinese law.

Together, these protections form a comprehensive IP fortress safeguarding Apple’s innovation and commercial interest globally.

The Conversion Practice: iPhone XR to iPhone 17 Pro Max

The “conversion” process typically involves modifying an iPhone XR to mimic the look, software interface, and branding of the iPhone 17 Pro Max. This can include:

1. Installing unauthorized firmware versions mimicking iOS 26,
2. Physically altering the casing to resemble the newer model,
3. Rebranding or remarketing the phone under Apple’s trademarked name.

Legal Implications

This practice is not a harmless customization. It constitutes IP infringement under multiple grounds:

1. Trademark Infringement: Rebranding a device as “iPhone 17 Pro Max” without authorization misleads consumers and dilutes Apple’s brand identity. This is a violation of Section 5 of Nigeria’s Trademarks Act, Lanham Act (U.S.), and Article 57 of China’s Trademark Law.
2. Copyright Infringement: Installing or distributing modified Apple firmware (unauthorized iOS versions) breaches Apple’s copyright and software license agreements.
3. Industrial Design & Patent Violation:
   Copying the iPhone 17 design or hardware configurations violates Apple’s industrial design and patent rights, particularly when done commercially.
4. Trade Secret Misuse: If the conversion uses or discloses confidential Apple schematics or software reverse-engineering, it may also breach trade secret protection under international law.

Applicable Legal Frameworks

1. International Law (WIPO)

Apple’s IP rights are enforceable globally through the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Under:

1. The Paris Convention (1883) for industrial property,
2. The Berne Convention (1886) for copyright, and
3. The TRIPS Agreement (1994) under the WTO,

member countries—including Nigeria, China, and the United States—must protect Apple’s IP rights within their jurisdictions.

2. Nigerian Law
3. Copyright Act 2022 (Sections 27–32): prohibits unauthorized reproduction, distribution, or adaptation of copyrighted works.

1. Trademarks Act (Cap T13, LFN 2004): criminalizes unauthorized use of registered marks.
2. Patents and Designs Act: protects industrial design and invention originality.

Violations can attract civil liability (damages, injunctions) and criminal penalties, including imprisonment and fines.

3. U.S. Law

Apple’s home jurisdiction provides strong remedies under:

1. Title 17 USC (Copyright Act),
2. Lanham Act (Trademark Law), and
3. Patent Act (35 U.S.C.).

Apple frequently sues counterfeiters and modifiers under these provisions.

4. Chinese Law

Although much of this conversion originates in China, Chinese IP Law (2020–2021 revisions) imposes strict penalties for:

1. Counterfeiting registered trademarks,
2. Manufacturing or exporting infringing products,
3. Reverse-engineering patented technology.
   China, as a WIPO member, enforces these under the State Intellectual Property Office (CNIPA).

Liability Analysis

1. The Company Converting the iPhone XR

Such a company directly infringes Apple’s IP by:

1. Using Apple’s registered marks without authorization,
2. Modifying firmware (copyrighted work),
3. Copying design and technical components (industrial design & patent infringement).

Under Nigerian law and WIPO conventions, this is an actionable civil and criminal offense.

1. Individuals Marketing the Converted Devices

Promoting or selling converted devices constitutes secondary infringement or aiding and abetting infringement.
Even advertising these products can violate Section 36 of Nigeria’s Copyright Act and Article 57 of China’s Trademark Law.

1. End Users

Although end users may not be prosecuted criminally, knowingly purchasing counterfeit or converted devices could lead to:

1. Loss of warranty and data protection,
2. Exposure to unsafe and non-compliant devices, and
3. Civil forfeiture if proven as willful participation in IP infringement.

What Should Be Done

1. Enforcement and Regulation

Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC), Trademarks, Patents, and Designs Registry, and Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) should collaborate to identify and restrict the importation or sale of such converted products.

1. Apple Inc. can initiate cease and desist notices, border measures, and civil suits.

2. Awareness and Education

IP practitioners, regulators, and the public must be educated on the economic and legal consequences of supporting counterfeit conversions.
Consumers need to know that authenticity and innovation are core values of IP protection.

3. Collaboration Between Jurisdictions

Since many of these conversions originate from China, bilateral cooperation between Nigeria Customs Service and Chinese IP enforcement agencies (CNIPA) is vital to curb illegal exports.

Conclusion

While converting an iPhone XR into an iPhone 17 Pro Max may appear innovative or cost-saving, it raises serious intellectual property violations and economic concerns.
Each iPhone model embodies years of research, design, and technological development protected by international IP laws.

By altering or misrepresenting Apple’s products, these conversion companies undermine the integrity of IP systems, distort the market, and erode trust in legitimate innovation.

The law is clear, unauthorized reproduction, modification, or branding of protected technology is illegal under Nigerian, U.S., Chinese, and WIPO frameworks.

Consumers, creators, and regulators must all play their part in protecting intellectual property—because the true value of innovation lies not in imitation, but in originality.