There is the need to review the existing committees and determine which of them is ad-hoc in nature – my review of their terms of reference suggests that most if not all of them are – and may have completed their tasks and ought to be wound up and whether there is the need to rationalize those of them that may not be ad-hoc in nature and reconstitute them into functional standing committees. In that regard, we must not confuse committees with Sections, Fora, Institutes and Teams (such as Prosecution Teams) and Task Forces. For want of a better illustrative comparison, Sections, For a and Institutes are similar to divisions of companies that are created or constituted for carrying out specific functions. They do not exercise oversight responsibilities over the executive management in the same way that governance committees (such as Audit and Finance Committees) do neither do they formulate governing policies for the organization.

To avoid the deprecatory blurred lines of responsibilities, roles and reporting lines that was highlighted in the KPMG Report, it would be critical and required that the functions and responsibilities of the afore-listed four organs of the Association – NEC, the elected part-time National Officers, the Standing Committees and the Executive Management – be well, properly and unambiguously defined and delineated.  In that regard and in conformance to corporate governance standards, there would need to be a published delegation of authority policy document that would define the authority and approval limits of the various organs and officials of the Association (both the elected National Officers and the executive management).  

I must mention here that NEC has a critical role to play in supervising the elected National Officers and by extension the executive management of the Association. Well structured, the quarterly NEC meetings provide the forum for the elected National Officers to render reports and accounts to NEC on their stewardship and the activities of the Association.  The discussions at such NEC meetings ought to be sufficiently robust, penetrative and rigorous to keep the elected National Officers and executive management constantly on their toes in the performance of their functions.  NEC members should have the benefit of receiving and reading in advance, not less than two weeks to the NEC meeting dates, well-prepared and well-articulated NEC-Memos and Reports on each of the agenda items.  Oral reporting on any agenda item, while permissible, should be actively discouraged; only oral adumbration of reports and memos should be routinely allowed.  The responsibility for ensuring that the right caliber of representation attend NEC meetings primarily falls on the branches save for the coopted members who are usually nominated by the President and approved by NEC. 

To gain full value from such a restructured corporate governance structure, complete with the defined roles of the various organs, it would be imperative that it be accompanied with and by several other reform initiatives some of which are addressed in the succeeding parts of these Reflections. The gains from these reform initiatives are, in my view, unquantifiable.  Just think of the efficiency level of a well-run, well-oiled, properly structured and organized institution, be they a business concern or a professional association or a non-governmental organization or an international agency. That is the efficiency level that the NBA should be striving towards and which we could attain if these reform initiatives are properly and faithfully implemented.   

More than that, we would be on the pathway towards the institutionalization of corporate governance standards which would lead to increased efficiency, transparency and accountability in the running of NBA affairs.  By employing adequately skilled and qualified personnel as part of the executive management and empowering them to handle the day-to-day affairs of the Association and maintain proper records, professionalism will be enthroned – and the records that would constitute the institutional memory of the Association would be well kept, maintained and preserved.  This will be elaborated upon in the subsequent pieces of the Reflections series. With the rationalization of the executive roles of the elected National Officers and offices, we may begin to see less of the rat-race by our members to occupy elected National Officers positions and, in the process, we would develop a far more wholesome process for the election of NBA officers.

Earlier on, astute litigator and strategist; Paul Usoro, SAN, spoke at the NBA Young Lawyers Forum, Ilorin Branch one Day Seminar.  In a Panel chaired by Mallam Yusuf Ali, SAN represented by K. Keleja, SAN, Mr. Usoro discussed the topic- “Veto Power and the Role of the Executive”.

Paul Usoro reiterated that the essence of veto power is to provide checks and balances in the management of the affairs of the country. He noted that there are three types of veto powers, viz: Absolute Veto, Pocket Veto and Line item Veto. Absolute veto occurs when a President vetoes the entire bill. Line item veto means to veto specific provisions of the law. Pocket veto, which is an indirect veto, occurs when the President neither assents to the bill nor vetoes the bill.

Elucidating on the veto power of the President as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, Mr. Usoro meticulously considered the provisions of Sections 58 (4) and 59 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. He pointed out that, “the veto power granted to the President is not absolute in the essence that it can be overridden by 2/3 members of the National Assembly. The difficulty in overriding the President’s veto by the National Assembly, according to him, is usually in having 2/3 members of the National Assembly to pass the bill into law after the President has vetoed the bill”.

Furthermore, he said that while the constitution does not require the President to state his reasons for vetoing a bill, the practice and normal thing to do is for the President to state why he does not agree with a particular provision of the bill or why he is vetoing the bill. According to him, “if the reason stated by the President resonates with the public, it actually can turn the public against the legislature, and even if the legislature overrides the President’s veto, public opinion traditionally will be against the legislature”.

The Learned Silk goes on to state that it makes sense to have veto power, and a President who has real conviction should go ahead and exercise his power of veto. He concluded his presentation by advising that it is always wise to exercise veto power very cautiously, because the legislature still has the responsibility to make the law.

Dr. Samuel C. Omenka

NBA Presidential aspirant Paul Usoro SAN, earlier today delivered a powerful lecture at the NBA Calabar branch week. The passionate Lawyer spoke on the tremendous investment opportunities of the Nigerian Agricultural sector. He stated that for Nigeria to metamorphose into an agro-industrialized economy, the Nigerian Governments should at all levels rigorously push for and apply polices channelled towards improving the focus on agro industries.

He further explained that the drive for achieving an agro-industrialised economy must be complemented with an improvement of rural and other basic infrastructure which are critical to agricultural transformation and establishment of a seamless value chain like rural electrification, road/rail for transportation of agricultural produce and processed/finished goods, for export and domestic use alike.

The gathering was well attended by the Chief Judge of Cross River State; Justice Michael Edem, the NBA Chairman (Calabar branch) Dr. Emmanuel Idaka,  Garun-Gabas SAN, the AG of Jigawa State, Emmanuel Essiet, Prof Dakas C. J. Dakas, SAN and other members of the Calabar branch.

Preamble

A lot has been happening in the political
sphere of the Nigerian state which has in one way or the other halted the
process of good governance and gave room to the rise of political instability,
propaganda instead of proper agenda by political players, nepotism and partisan
politics etc. This article is about one of the most significant event that took
place in the political disposition of Nigeria involving a senator and his
constituency members who initiated a recall process due to his alleged
nonperformance.

Meaning                                                                                                                                        
According to the 4^th
Edition of Cambridge dictionary, recall is defined as “to order the return of a
person who belongs to an organization…..”

Moreover,
based on the subject of discourse, it is also a constitutional instrument
voters can use to unseat a serving lawmaker before the end of their tenure. It is democratic and tallies with the right of the people
to choose their representatives and also constitutional as evidenced in sections 68 & 69 of the 1999
constitution of Nigeria respectively.

Dino’s Recall
Process And its Resultant Effect

Futhermore,the
Dino’s recall all began on 24^th June 2017 when the Independent
National Electoral Commission, INEC, received a petition from members of the
electorate in Kogi West Constituents (Senator Melaye’s constituency),
requesting the commission to set in motion the democratic process of recall of
Senator Melaye, who they claimed, was not representing them well. Consequently,
Melaye was notified in this regard in line with section 69 of the 1999 CFRN.
However,
the lawmaker filed a fundamental rights enforcement suit accusing INEC of not
affording him fair hearing by not serving him with a copy of the petition to
enable him respond. He equally wanted an order of perpetual injunction,
restraining INEC from commencing with the recall process. This consequently led
INEC to suspend the recall process.

Flowing from the proceeds of
the court’s ruling, the electoral commission, however got the permission to
proceed with the recall process as the court struck out the suit for having no
cause of action and went further to state that INEC was acting within its
statutory powers as enshrined in section
116 of Electoral Act 2010 and section 69 of 1999 CFRN
respectively. Thus, it did not act ultra
vires.

The unfolding debacle of Mr.
Melaye’s recall process has no doubt elicited curiosity amongst Nigerians about
one of the most obscured but powerful constitutional instruments in Nigeria’s
evolving democratic system.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria 1999 in Section 68 and 69 provides for the recall of senators
and members of the House of Representatives. 
It requires that  a petition signed by more than one half of the
persons registered to vote in the member’s constituency alleging that they have
lost confidence in that member be presented to the chairman of INEC. The
petition is subjected to verification where the signatures of the petitioners
are verified and for this to be successful, 50 per cent plus one of the
registered voters in the constituency needs to be verified. After which a
referendum is conducted by INEC and if it is approved by a simple majority of
voters registered in that member’s constituency, the member stands recalled.

The provision
for recall of legislators is based on the sovereignty of the people affirmed in
Section 14 (2) (a) of the Constitution; that sovereignty belongs to the people
of Nigeria from whom government through the constitution derives all its powers
and authority.

Flowing from
the above, the verification date was 28^th April 2018, upon which if
the process was successful, the commissioner would have proceeded to the next
stage where a referendum of all registered voters will be conducted in line
with the electoral laws and that was scheduled for 5^th May 2018. The
verification exercise took place at 552 polling units of the 7 LGAs that made
up the senatorial district Melaye is representing. Only 18,742 out of 188,588
signatories were verified. It fell well below the requirement of the law that
50% plus 1 of the signatories to the petition had to be verified. It should
also be noted that Millions of Naira has been spent on this process.

The constitution anticipates a good faith process based on
honesty of purpose. However for constituents to lose confidence in a
legislator, there must have been some misdeeds or offences committed by the
legislator such as mismanagement of constituency project money for personal
gains. Alternatively, the member must have been docile without sponsoring
appropriate bills and motions that could contribute to issues of national
importance.

Conclusion                                                                                                                               
It is
germane to state that no successful recall of any lawmaker has been recorded in
the history of our democracy. The popular belief being held in this regard is that
once a legislator receives the people’s mandate, no one can truncate their
tenure. This encourages and promotes recklessness, indifference and nonchalant
attitude among them. Though the recall process might have failed, but Nigerians
now know that they can begin to exercise their civil and constitutional right
whenever they feel any member representing them is found wanting by initiating
the recall process. The Melaye’s case is indeed a new dawn in our fragile
democracy.

However,
a popular maxim in law says that “he who
comes to equity must come with clean
hands”. Therefore, the recall process should not be an opportunity to
settle political scores; it should be based on empirical evidence, good reasons
and honesty of purpose.

Eloho Yekovie ESQ


Triax Solicitors

www.triaxsolicitors.com

Government, as we have come to
know it today amongst other things exists to ensure the realisation of societal
values such as protection of rights, preservation of lives, maintaining
law and order, and providing basic human and social amenities, to name a few.
However, the government itself must be protected so as to safeguard against it
(government) destroying the values it was originally set up to protect. 

In a bid to find a working
balance for the preservation of government itself, what we have come to know
commonly today as the “Doctrine of Separation of Powers” was created alongside
other concepts as a solution to protecting government from itself while ensuring
the realisation of societal values.

The doctrine of Separation of
Powers simply means the devolution of state powers and functions among the
three independent and separate organs of government, the Executive, Legislature
and the Judiciary. The concept of Separation of Powers however has been
mixed up with other concepts like checks and balances, wherein the organs of
government perform distinct functions different from the others, thereby
preventing the concentration of unbridled power in the hands of a single branch
of government, preventively forestalling the evolution of autocratic
institutions. In emphasising the foregoing, the Court of Appeal in the case of Hon.
Abdullahi Maccido Ahmad v. Sokoto State House of Assembly & Anor (2002, 44
WRN 52) held Per Salami JCA that the doctrine of separation of powers has three
implications to wit;

1.    
The same person should not be part of more than one
of the arms or division of government;

2.    
One branch should not dominate
or control another arm. This is particularly important in the relationship
between (the) executive and the courts; (emphasis mine)

3.    
One branch should not attempt to exercise the
function of the other.

With the advent of the Fourth
Republic, Nigeria inherited the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria as altered (the 1999 Constitution) from the last Military Government,
which reflected, though in more subtle tones, the autocratic-style system of
government ran by the Military between the years 1983 – 1998. While the people
clamoured for and were promised a Federal system of governance in the in-coming
democratic government to be ushered in, the Constitution drafted by the
Military government fell short of the expectations of Nigerians. The
shortcomings of the Constitution would later be revealed in coming years.

There has been growing public
clamour for urgent Constitutional amendments to address several inadequacies of
the Constitution. Issues around true Federalism (proper devolution of powers
amongst the federating units), and balance of powers amongst the arms of
government particularly financial autonomy for the arms of government at the
State level topped the list of constitutional amendments sought by the people. 

As a result, the 8th National
Assembly embarked on addressing these issues. The product of this exercise led
to the passage of twenty three (23) Bills, a number of which were recently
assented to by President Buhari. Most popular of those Bills is the “Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration, No. 27) Act” which
effectively reduces the constitutional age for running for public offices and
has been colloquially termed “Not To Young To Run” Bill. Others include;

1.    
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(4th Alteration) Act, No. 4 which amends Section 121(3) of the 1999
Constitution to allow State Legislatures, Judiciaries and Independent Electoral
Commissions draw their statutory allocations directly from the Consolidated
Revenue Fund of the Federation and no longer through that of the State; 

2.    
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(4th Alteration) Act, No. 21 which amends Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution
regulating the determination of pre-election matters; and 

3.    
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(4th Alteration) Act, No. 16 which provides that a person (either Vice
President or Deputy Governor) sworn in to complete the tenure of an elected
President or Governor can only be re-elected into that office for not more than
one term. This effectively resolves a highly contentious issue in Nigeria’s
politics.

Being constitutional
amendments, the Bills in line with the provisions of Sections 9(1), 9(2) and 58
of the Constitution had received the support of a minimum of two thirds
majority of the members of each of the Federal Legislative Chambers as well as
the approval of more than two thirds of all the thirty-six States in Nigeria
before presidential assent was granted.

SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NIGERIA

PART 2 of the 1999 Constitution
sets out the framework for separation of state power in Nigeria. Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the 1999 Constitution clearly devolves the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial powers of the Nigerian State on the three organs of government, that
is, the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary both at the Federal and State
levels respectively.

Nonetheless, in the independent
exercise of their individual functions, the Constitution allows for
interdependence between the different organs. This interdependence is founded
on the doctrine of checks and balances which although recognises the division
of state powers and functions among the organs of government, it does not allow
exclusive control of those powers in the arms of the organs. For example,
Section 5(4) of the Constitution does not allow the President exercise his
powers to declare war without a majority vote of the National Assembly.
Similarly, by the provisions of Sections 143 and 188 of the 1999 Constitution,
the Legislature is empowered to conduct impeachment proceedings against a
President, Vice President, Governor or Deputy Governor for gross misconduct in
the performance of the functions of his office. See ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS v. ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ORS (2007) 10
NWLR (PT. 1041) 1S.C. Section 4(8) of the Constitution also subjects the
exercise of legislative powers by the Legislature to the jurisdiction of the
courts of law and judicial tribunals established by law. In elucidating the
purpose of this power of court, the court in the case of Honourable Godwin
Jideonwu & Ors v. Governor of Bendel State & Ors. (1981) 1 NCLR 4, held
inter alia that the constitution clearly sets out the powers of the three arms
of government, and if the legislature passes any law which is beyond its
competence, and which it has no jurisdiction to pass, whether or not it was
passed by all the members of the House of Assembly, any member of the House of
Assembly or an affected member of the public can challenge it in court, and
nothing prevents the court from setting it aside and declaring it ultra vires
the legislature (i.e. beyond the powers of the legislature). Also, in the case
of Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation and
22 Ors. (1982) 3 NCLR 1, the Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 4(8)
of the 1979 Constitution, the courts of law in Nigeria have the power and duty
to see to it that there is no infraction of the exercise of legislative power,
whether substantive or procedural, as laid down in the Constitution. If there
is any such infraction, the courts have the power to declare any legislation
passed pursuant to it unconstitutional and void.

From the preceding discussions,
it is clear that Separation of Powers and the doctrine of checks and balances
abhors the dominance of one organ over the other organs. This was restated by
the Court of Appeal in the case of Hon. Abdullahi Maccido Ahmad v. Sokoto State
House of Assembly & Anor (Supra) where the court held that one branch of
government should not dominate or control the other arm. 

JUDICIAL AUTONOMY

It is an undeniable fact that
for the judiciary to live up to its responsibilities, it must be able to
perform its constitutional functions fairly, independently and transparently
without fear or favour from any external body, institution or arm of
government. True independence connotes an organ’s ability to perform its
functions without any other organ holding sway or having an opportunity to
exercise undue influence over it.

By virtue of Section 81(3) of
the 1999 Constitution, the organs of government at the federal level all have
financial autonomy, hence, they are able to exercise of their constitutional
functions and powers without any external piper calling the tune. The
Constitution provides that budgetary allocation for the judiciary is paid
directly to the National Judicial Council for disbursement to heads of courts.
There is no similar provision under Section 121 of the 1999 Constitution at the
state level. Budgetary allocations for States are paid into the Consolidated
Revenue Fund of the State under the control of the Governor who then disburses
to the other organs of government. This system has however fostered a situation
of the piper calling the tune and has placed the Judiciary in very difficult
positions in times past, threatening the very fabric of Separation of
Power and checks and balances at the State level, which our democracy ‘rests
on’. We have therefore seen State Executives wielding enormous powers to
the detriment of the other organs because they play the role of the piper
calling the tune which the Judiciary and Legislature are sometimes forced to
dance to.

In a democracy, the
independence of the judiciary is sacrosanct and cannot be compromised for any
reason whatsoever. Therefore, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999 (4th Alteration) Act, No. 4 which amends Section 121(3) of the
Constitution, granting financial autonomy to the State Judiciaries and which
was recently signed into law by President Buhari is crucial to the
strengthening of our democracy. The State Judiciary is now empowered to prepare
and submit before the State House of Assembly its budget for each year. Amounts
standing to the credit of the State Judiciary as budgetary allocations would
henceforth be paid directly to the Judiciary and no longer into the
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the States under the control of the State
Governors. In the same vein, the Constitutional amendment also grants financial
autonomy to the State Legislatures and State Independent Electoral Commissions.
Thus, all three organs are financially autonomous and none occupies a dominant
position. It is hoped that this amendment would further empower the organs of
government at the state levels to fully carry out their functions and exercise
their powers under the constitution to uphold the doctrine of Separation of
Power and checks and balances so as to foster a thriving democracy.

Notably, a very crucial Bill on
devolution of powers from the centre to the federating units which was
presented to the National Assembly was not passed into law as the Senate voted
against it in 2017, although the House of Representatives had resolved to
revisit it nothing new was done with it. This Bill on devolution of powers
seeks to move items on the exclusive legislative list of the Constitution to
the concurrent legislative list, thus giving more powers to States.

For the most part, this Bill is
by far the most important of all Bills considered on the floor of the National
Assembly during this Constitutional Amendment process as it would have given us
true federalism in all its glory. However, the country has taken several
positive steps in the right direction with the hope that the proper devolution
of power to the federating units would happen sooner than later. It is only
then that true federalism can begin to thrive in Nigeria.

YOU TOO CAN BE PRESIDENT.

The Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration, No. 27) Act, specifically amends
the provisions of Sections 65 (1)(b), 106(b), 131(b) of the 1999 Constitution
which prescribes the minimum qualifications for election into the Federal and
State Legislative houses and the office of the President. 

The amendment effectively
reduces the minimum age requirement for eligibility to contest for the office
of the President from 40 years to 35 years while that of the Federal and State
Legislative Houses has been effectively reduced from 30 years to 25 years.
However, the minimum age requirements for eligibility to contest for the office
of the Governor of a State and a seat in the Senate was retained at 35 years.

Following the passage of this
Bill into law, the participation of younger Nigerians in politics is no longer
limited to the exercise of the civic right to vote, the horizon has been
broadened. The opportunities for younger Nigerians to run for office, bring in
qualitative leadership and implement fresh ideas and policies now exist. It is
therefore left for the youths to rise to the occasion, take advantage of this
amendment, engage in the electoral process from the driver’s seat, change the
game and bring about the desired change we all yearn for.

THE GOOD-LUCK IMBROGLIO 

There’s also the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (4th Alteration) Act, No. 16 which provides
that a person (either Vice President or Deputy Governor) sworn in to complete
the tenure of an elected President or Governor can only be re-elected into that
office for not more than one term. This effectively resolves the highly
contentious issue that created a lot of political tension and was litigated in
the run up to the 2015 general elections. The amendment provides that in such a
situation the Vice President turned substantive President or Deputy Governor
turned substantive Governor can only run for office once. The rationale behind
this is that since the President and his predecessor in office ran on the same
electoral ticket, he is only entitled to a second electoral ticket as the
Constitution delimits the numbers of times a person can run for the Office of
the President and Vice President, Governor and Deputy Governor to two.
Furthermore, allowing such a person to run more than once would amount to him
or her been sworn into office three-times, a situation which the 1999
Constitution does not provide for.

Another key amendment towards
strengthening our democracy is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria (4th Alteration) Act, No. 21 which amends Section 285 of the 1999
Constitution regulating the determination of pre-election matters. Undoubtedly,
there is no strong democracy without a seamless electoral process. To this end,
this amendment is very important in ensuring seamless electoral processes by
making substantive provisions for the timely hearing and determination of
pre-election matters before the conduct of elections.

Hitherto, there has not been
any law stipulating the time frame within which an aggrieved person can
approach the court for redress on pre-election matters such as the nomination,
disqualification, substitution and party sponsorship of candidates as well as
the period within which the court ought to have finally determined the suit.
This new amendment introduces six (6) new paragraphs which provide for the
specified period of time within which a pre-election matter can be instituted
and determined by the court, as well as the institution and determination of
any appeal arising from such pre-election matter. The amendment particularly
empowers the court to suspend determination of any interlocutory applications
or preliminary objections until delivery of final judgment so as to ensure that
time is not tactically wasted and the court can resolve the suit within the
specified timeframe.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that these new
amendments would serve as a catalyst for the much needed and desired growth and
strengthening of our democracy and its institutions, although true Federalism
is still yearned for. 

Obaloluwa Adeleke 

is a Partner at Awosika Adeleke Ojo 


Source: LinkedIn 

The required reforms in the NBA
must logically start from its apex, to wit, the governance structure at the
national level.  The current governance structure of the Association does
not have any defined role for an executive management.  Indeed, it does
not even define and/or delineate properly, if at all, the roles of the elected
part-time NBA National Officers and the administrative officials in the
National Secretariat.  As the NBA-commissioned January 2018 KPMG
Diagnostic Review of Financial Management and Reporting Process (“KPMG Report”)
states, “currently, the elected NEC officers have significant administrative
involvement in management activities such as financial control, human resources
and recruitment, and staff training . . . The elected officers, who are
part-time officers are challenged with overseeing and managing the operations
of the Secretariat while also playing crucial executive leadership roles in
their primary law practices”.

The NBA operates the Town or
Village Union leadership model similar to an Ibibio, Annang or Efik Peoples
Union where, illustratively, officers for the running of the Unions are elected
from the membership.  Those Unions with their limited membership and
activities have no need for executive management; their books and records, as
rudimentary as they usually are, are maintained by the elected part-time
officials.  The budgets and activities of those Unions are nothing
compared to the income/expenditure budgets, let alone, the activities of the
NBA.  Without a doubt, the NBA of 2018 has outgrown the 1960s Town Union
leadership model that was used in the early days of the Association when our
membership was small and our activities and budgets not as sprawling. 

According to the Association’s
website, as at date, “the NBA has a membership of over 105,406 lawyers active
in 125 Branches across the 36 States, including the Federal Capital Territory
of Nigeria.  It is organized into three Practice Sections, eleven Fora,
and two Institutes, all supported by one National Secretariat”.  That is a
far more complex Association than was envisaged when the current Town Union
leadership model was designed for the NBA.  The operational complexities
of the Association in 2018 justify the delegation of day-to-day operations and
management of the NBA by the elected part-time National Officers to an
executive management team made up of suitably qualified, skilled and
experienced full-time personnel.

The elected part-time National
Officers would not be out of job thereby. The efficient running and operation
of the NBA at the national level will still remain their responsibility – in
the same way that Boards of companies and institutions retain primary
responsibility for the efficient running and management of companies – save
that the elected part-time National Officers will delegate as much of those
day-to-day operational functions to the executive management who will report
directly to the elected National Officers and be supervised by them.  The
elected National Officers will provide the policy direction and roadmap for
running the Association.  That way, efficiency and corporate governance
would be entrenched in the operations of the Association and the elected
National Officers could still rightly claim credit for the successful
operations and management of the NBA and, conversely, own up to the failures
thereof.  The elected part-time National Officers will in turn report to
NEC (National Executive Committee) made up of the Branch officials and co-opted
NEC members, not any different from the reporting line between the Board of any
organization and its shareholders, except that, in the case of the NBA the reporting
would be done quarterly during NEC meetings.

The fourth organ of the NBA at
the national level that we should institutionalize would be the Standing
Committees.  Standing committees, unlike their ad-hoc counterparts, attend
to specific recurring issues and generally assist the elected NEC officials in
the formulation of policies relating to the Committees’ specific areas of
focus; where required and necessary and always at the instance of the elected
National Officers, the Committees may also assist in supervising the
implementation or execution of such policies, after their adoption and/or
ratification by the elected National Officers and/or the NEC.  The number
of such standing committees would traditionally depend on the exigencies of the
organization or institution, at any given time; the numbers, in any case, are
not usually static or fixed.

Illustratively, the NBA could
have a Standing Committee on Constitution Review with primary responsibility
for periodically proposing required amendments to our Constitution based on new
and prevailing trends and developments e.g. the issues in my current
Reflections.  On the governance front, the Association ought to have,
amongst others, a Finance and Audit Committee that would work with external
advisers, inter alia, to entrench internal control policies and procedures in
the Association and work with elected National Officers in ensuring absolute
adherence to these policies and procedures. By their very nature, standing
committees and their records constitute institutional memory for the
Association. In order to retain, enhance and transmit such institutional
records and also create a succession plan within the Association, the
membership of the standing committees could be staggered in a manner that
ensures that the tenure of the members overlap, and do not all expire at the
same time.

I must enter a critical caveat
here on the constitution of committees generally: given our penchant for
patronage and reward systems, we must resist the temptation to proliferate the
number of standing committees and their membership.  That would be
counter-productive and wasteful.  The elected National Officers who have
responsibility for constituting committees must, prior to the constitution of
any committee, conduct a needs-analysis and be convinced – and also be able to
convince the general membership of the Association whenever the question is
raised – that there is a need for any such committee, standing or ad-hoc, and
that the constitution of the committee’s membership is justified and prudent
and definitely not wasteful or sprawling in size.

Have you experienced police extortion or brutality; do you know anyone who has experienced it or are you dissatisfied with the current trend and reports of police extortion/brutality by members of the police especially SARS operatives?

Then write a petition to the National Assembly requesting a public hearing on the subject matter and hopefully such public hearing will transform into police reforms.

Simply copy the template below & tag the following public officials with the hashtag  #EndSarsPetition @nassnigeria @thepublicsenate @bukolasaraki @yakubdogara @YomiShogunle @PoliceNG @PoliceNG_PCRRU @Legalnaija

PETITION TEMPLATE

Dear Sir/Ma,

Please take this as notice of my dissatisfaction with the ongoing national trends and reports of police brutality and extortion by police officers. Especially members of the SARS & FSARS police unit.

Kindly use your good office to initiate a public hearing on these allegations that would promote police reforms. 

A concerned Nigerian.

Thank you.

Name –

State –

There is no gain stressing
the significant role Talent Managers, Agencies, and Management Companies, play
in the careers of talented individuals in the entertainment industry.

Every Michael Jackson,
Lionel Messi, Denzel Washington, Kenny Blaq, and other known successful
cultural icons need equally excellent supporting casts that can help chart a
progressive route to growth, profitability, and longevity. At the core of this
supporting cast is a Talent Manager.

In simple terms, Talent
Managers organize and advance the careers of talented individuals. They are
important in the scheme of things, as they are known to possess an eye for
talent and an ability to create bankable stars, which may include actors,
artists, musicians, or athletes. They are responsible for seeking job
opportunities for clients and representing your clients’ interests during the
negotiation of contracts.

In view of the above,
talents in the creative industry, entertainers, filmmakers, record producers,
and others, must seek answers to certain pertinent questions before
surrendering their careers to a talent manager.

Here are 10 questions
entertainers should ask before signing a Talent Management Contract.

1.    
HOW LONG WILL THIS RELATIONSHIP LAST?

For a new relationship, the
shorter the term, the better. Most Management Agreements come with an initial
term (one year), with an option to extend duration if both parties find the
relationship mutually beneficial. If during the initial term, all or most
expectations were met, parties can negotiate for extension. Talents must ensure
that there is clarity on the duration of a management relationship. This will
help them avoid being stuck in a lengthy unfavorable contract.

2.    
IS THERE A PROBATIONARY PERIOD?

The Talent/Manager
relationship is an intimate one. As such, parties must maintain the enthusiasm
and passion needed to make the relationship profitable. It is advisable to
agree to a trial period during which time the parties will commit to exploring
the depth of the newly established relation on a personal note, creative-wise
or with respect to business.

If at the end of the trial
period the enthusiasm has been deflated, or the expectations crushed, parties
may decide to terminate the relationship. It is advisable Talents insist on a
probationary period in their talent management contracts.

3.    
WHAT IS THE EXPERTISE OF THE MANAGER?

What a Talent expects from
his manager is largely dependent on where he is positioned as Talent in his
industry and his level of relevance and notoriety.

As there are different types
of talents with diverse areas of strength and weaknesses, same applies to
Managers. The expertise a Manager possesses is central to achieving set
objectives for the benefit of the Talent.

4.    
WILL THE MANAGER DOUBLE AS PUBLICIST?

The management contract
should give clarity as to whether the manager would go beyond the call of duty
to double as a publicist. By virtue of experience, some talent managers can
help manage relationships with the media, arranging interviews, charity events,
media parleys and public appearances. For a new talent with limited budget, it
is advisable to agree on whether the manager would serve in both capacities or
if it is clear cut that a publicist should be hired.

5.    
WHAT PERCENTAGE OF MY EARNINGS GO TO THE
MANAGER?

A standard management fee
ranges from 10% – 20%. However, the rate is open to negotiation and will depend
on the stature of the parties, and other variables. There are many channels of
revenue (tours, album sales, label advances, licensing and merchandising) from
which a manger may earn. Therefore, there must be clarity on the remuneration
of the Manager.

6.    
GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION.

Every Talent wants globally
dominance. This could cause strategic building of relationships that could help
actualize this. If Talents want representation covered in different interested
markets, it is advisable to negotiate contracts specific to such territories.
This means Talents must find managers who have knowledge and mastery of the
preferred markets, and can properly represent their interests.

This point should be given
utmost consideration when negotiating and executing a management agreement.

7.    
WHO RECEIVES PAYMENT FROM BUYERS OF
SERVICES?

Many managers do not want to
collect the money and be required to prepare and tender accounting statements
to an artiste. The artiste in turn may feel completely comfortable relying on
the manager to collect such monies. This should be agreed upon by both parties.

8.    
HOW LONG SHOULD THE MANAGER CONTINUE TO
RECEIVE COMMISSION?

It is important to agree on
when a manager stops receiving commissions after the expiration of the
management. While some may stop receiving commissions after the expiration of
contract, others might intend to continue to receive commissions on
transactions brokered during the duration of a work relationship. Parties
should make sure there is mutual understanding on this point.

9.    
IS THERE ANY PROVISION FOR A POWER OF
ATTORNEY?

An artist management
contract will often contain a provision which seeks to grant the artist manager
a power of attorney. The purpose of this is to allow the manager to sign
documents and contract on behalf of the artist, as if he or she were personally
signing the document. It is advisable for an artiste to grant only a Limited
Power of Attorney; while talents don’t want to hinder their manager’s job, they
can control how this power of attorney is wielded by adding a clause to the
contract that stipulates that for certain types of transactions, the manager
must obtain written consent before any such transactions or decisions are made.

10. HOW
WILL THE MANAGER’S EXPENSES BE COVERED?

An agreement should be
reached on how expenses will work. Talents don’t have to pay for manager’s
phone costs or office costs or business trips, or they might have to.

What are your
thoughts on the points highlighted? We want to hear your thoughts.

If you have any
questions, use the comment section, or get in touch via +2347014979879 or
hightowerlawyers@gmail.com. You will be glad you did.

PLEASE ENDEAVOR TO
SHARE THIS ARTICLE ON YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA TIMELINES. BE SOCIAL. SHARING IS
CARING!

Source: Hightower Solicitors