State Control of Academic Choice and Fundamental Rights in Nigeria: A Constitutional Critique of Employability-Based Course Elimination[1]

Abstract

This article interrogates the constitutionality of the Federal Government’s policy to phase out certain university courses based on employability metrics. Contrary to arguments that such a policy falls within regulatory discretion, this paper contends that it violates fundamental human rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Specifically, it argues that the policy infringes on freedom of thought, expression, and the right to non-discrimination, while indirectly undermining the right to dignity. Drawing on judicial authorities and constitutional theory, the article establishes that state interference in academic choice constitutes an unjustifiable encroachment on intellectual autonomy in a democratic society.

1. Introduction

The Federal Government’s proposal to eliminate certain academic programmes deemed “non-employable” raises profound constitutional concerns. While framed as an economic intervention, the policy intrudes into the intellectual sphere traditionally protected in liberal democracies.

This article argues that beyond policy considerations, the proposal amounts to a constitutional infraction, particularly when examined through the lens of fundamental human rights.

2. Re-Examining the Constitutional Right to Education through Chapter IV

2.1 Beyond Chapter II: Derivative Rights Doctrine

Although the right to education is contained in Chapter II of the Constitution and is generally non-justiciable, Nigerian courts have, in certain contexts, adopted a purposive and expansive interpretation of fundamental rights.

In Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 222, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Chapter II provisions may guide interpretation of enforceable rights.

Similarly, in Fawehinmi v Abacha (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228, the Court affirmed that constitutional provisions, and even international human rights norms, should be interpreted broadly to advance justice.

Thus, the right to education may be indirectly enforceable where it intersects with rights under Chapter IV.

2.2 Education as a Vehicle for Fundamental Rights

Education is not merely a socio-economic benefit; it is the foundation for the exercise of other rights, including:

  • Freedom of expression (s 39)
  • Freedom of thought (s 38)

By restricting access to certain fields of study, the state effectively limits the content and scope of intellectual development, thereby constraining these rights.

3. Freedom of Thought and Expression: The Core Violation

3.1 Intellectual Autonomy as a Constitutional Value

Freedom of thought under section 38 protects not only religious beliefs but also intellectual exploration and academic inquiry.

In Director of SSS v Olisa Agbakoba (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt 595) 314, the Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional freedoms must be interpreted expansively in a democratic society.

Academic disciplines represent structured avenues for thought. Eliminating them constitutes state-imposed intellectual limitation, which is antithetical to constitutional democracy.

3.2 Chilling Effect on Expression

The removal of courses, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, creates a chilling effect on expression.

Drawing from comparative jurisprudence such as Sweezy v New Hampshire 354 US 234 (1957), academic freedom has been recognised as a “special concern of the First Amendment.” While not binding in Nigeria, such reasoning is persuasive.

Suppressing entire fields of study indirectly suppresses:

  • Research
  • Debate
  • Critical thought

This amounts to a structural infringement of freedom of expression.

4. Discrimination and Structural Inequality

4.1 Indirect Discrimination under Section 42

Although the policy appears neutral, its effects are not.

Students from less privileged backgrounds, who rely on public universities, are disproportionately affected. Wealthier individuals may still access such courses abroad or in private institutions.

In Uzoukwu v Ezeonu II (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt 200) 708, the Court recognised that fundamental rights must be interpreted to prevent subtle and indirect discrimination.

Thus, the policy may violate section 42 by creating class-based educational inequality.

4.2 Targeting of Non-STEM Disciplines

Empirical patterns suggest that such policies often target:

  • Arts
  • Humanities
  • Social sciences

This raises concerns about ideological discrimination, particularly where these disciplines foster critical engagement with governance and society.

5. Human Dignity and the Right to Self-Actualisation

5.1 Expanding Section 34 (Right to Dignity)

The right to dignity under section 34 has been interpreted broadly to include respect for individual autonomy.

In Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt 711) 206, the Supreme Court affirmed that individuals have the right to make personal decisions affecting their lives.

Choosing a field of study is a core element of personal identity and self-actualisation. State interference in such choice undermines dignity.

5.2 Instrumentalisation of Citizens

By prioritising employability over individual preference, the state risks treating citizens as mere economic units, rather than autonomous persons.

This contradicts constitutional values rooted in dignity and freedom.

6. Limits of Section 45 Justifications

Section 45 permits restrictions on certain rights in the interest of:

  • Public safety
  • Public order
  • Public morality
  • Public health

Economic efficiency or employability is not expressly listed.

Even if “public welfare” is implied, restrictions must satisfy proportionality.

In Dokubo-Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt 1048) 320, the Supreme Court emphasised that limitations on rights must not be arbitrary or excessive.

Eliminating entire academic disciplines is arguably:

  • Overbroad
  • Disproportionate
  • Not the least restrictive means

7. Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy

Although not explicitly codified, academic freedom is a recognised constitutional value.

In University of Ilorin v Oluwadare (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt 1000) 751, the Court acknowledged the importance of university autonomy in academic matters.

Centralised elimination of courses undermines:

  • Institutional independence
  • Curriculum diversity
  • Scholarly innovation

8. Policy vs Constitution: Where the Line is Drawn

While the government has regulatory powers, such powers are not absolute.

As held in Governor of Lagos State v Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 621, the rule of law requires that all governmental actions conform to constitutional provisions.

Thus, policy convenience cannot override fundamental rights.

9. Conclusion

Contrary to the argument that employability-based course elimination is merely a policy choice, this article has demonstrated that it raises serious constitutional concerns.

The policy:

  1. Restricts intellectual freedom protected under sections 38 and 39
  2. Creates indirect discrimination contrary to section 42
  3. Undermines human dignity under section 34
  4. Fails the proportionality test under section 45

Accordingly, it may be argued that the policy constitutes an unconstitutional intrusion into the intellectual and personal autonomy of Nigerian citizens.

 

References

Legislation

  • Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) ch IV, ss 34, 38, 39, 42, 45

Cases

  • Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 222
  • Fawehinmi v Abacha (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228
  • Director of SSS v Olisa Agbakoba (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt 595) 314
  • Uzoukwu v Ezeonu II (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt 200) 708
  • Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt 711) 206
  • Dokubo-Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt 1048) 320
  • University of Ilorin v Oluwadare (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt 1000) 751
  • Governor of Lagos State v Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 621

Foreign Case (Persuasive Authority)

  • Sweezy v New Hampshire 354 US 234 (1957)

Textbooks & Academic Works

  • Ben Nwabueze, Constitutional Law of the Nigerian Republic (Spectrum Books)
  • M T Okany, Nigerian Administrative Law (Africana First Publishers)
  • HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press)
  • Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press)

Reports & Commentary

  • National Human Rights Commission, Nigeria – Fundamental Rights Framework
  • UNESCO, Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel

 

[1] Adebola V. Adeleye Esq. MBA is a corporate practice lawyer with keen interest in compliance, corporate governance M&A and risk management. He is also a certified Human Resources Manager. adeleyebola93@gmail.com 08088953829