The Absence Of An Oath Clause In A Sworn Declaration: How Fatal? | Abdulkabir Badmos

The Absence Of An Oath Clause In A Sworn Declaration: How Fatal? | Abdulkabir Badmos

The Absence Of An Oath Clause In A Sworn Declaration: How Fatal?[1]

INTRODUCTION

At one point or the other in one’s legal practice in Nigeria, there is the likelihood of haven been faced with the challenge of wriggling out of a situation where due to inadvertence of counsel, the oath clause is omitted in an affidavit or a witness statement on oath to be used in court. This error is sometimes discovered only after the affidavit has been filed and the case is to come up for hearing. While many litigators who find themselves in these unpleasant situations simply blame the omission on their secretaries, the junior lawyers in the firm bear the brunt in others. This article therefore interrogates the absence of an oath clause in a sworn declaration vis-à-vis the provisions of Oaths Act, LFN 2004, conflicting judicial interpretations of the Court of Appeal and until the recent intervention by the Supreme Court of Nigeria.

SWORN DECLARATIONS AND THE REQUIREMENT OF AN OATH CLAUSE.

In the trial of cases in Nigeria, the Rules of the various courts provide that evidence may be adduced either by filing an affidavit, as in suits commenced by originating summons/motions procedure or witness statements on oath where the suit is commenced by a writ of summons. Whichever of these procedures is adopted, a written declaration on oath is required as an integral part of the frontloaded processes (or interlocutory applications) before the Court, prior to the date set down for hearing. In defining an affidavit, the court held in the case of Onujabe v. Idris[2] as follows:

“An affidavit is a statement of facts or declaration made either on oath or affirmation before an authorized person. The averments in an affidavit are admissible as a fact until disproved because the averments are sworn before a commissioner for oaths. The life of an affidavit is the declaration on oath. What makes that piece of paper an affidavit competent to support the motion on notice is the attestation or swearing before the Commissioner for oaths. Once the document is not sworn to, it is a mere piece of paper not an affidavit. Therefore without oath there is no affidavit.”

A distinguishing feature of an affidavit therefore, that sets it apart from every other declaration is that it is made on oath before a person authorized to administer oaths. Persons authorized to administer oaths include the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Presidents and Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, Judges of the Federal High Court, Notaries Public and Commissioners for oaths.[3]

Essentially, affidavits used in judicial proceedings constitute and forms part of the body of evidence led in a case.[4] An affidavit therefore, by the provision of the First Schedule to the Oaths Act, and usual practice, concludes with a paragraph that reads:

“I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I make the solemn declaration conscientiously, believing same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act.”

It is therefore considered a settled position of the law that a sworn declaration must contain the above words for it to be valid and admissible in evidence. The absence of the words, before now, is seen as a fundamental defect as to the substance and not form, curable under Section 4 (2) (b) and (c) of the Oaths Act or Section 113 of the Evidence Act, 2011. In the case of GTB v. ABIODUN[5], the Court of Appeal per PAUL OBI ELECHI, JCA held:

 

“As stated earlier in the course of this judgment, any written statement which does not bear the 1st schedule to Section 13 of the Oath Act, can not be said to be a written statement on oath. It is this vital aspect of the oath that is missing in the written statement of the Respondent’s sole witness in the present appeal. Non compliance with the provisions of the Oaths Act is a breach of the Oath Act. The consequence is that the entire statement of the Respondent sole witness is left bare. The Rules of Court are not made for fun, they are made to be obeyed. See: Hard v. Hact (1990) 1 NWLR (pt 126) 276, Tom Ikimi v. Godwin Omamnli (1995) 3 NWLR (pt 383), Ibrahim v. Col Cletus Emein & Ors (1996) 2 NWLR (pt 430) 322, Tehat A.O. Sule v. Nigeria Cocoa Board (1985) All NLR 257, Odu v. Jolaoso (2002) 37 WRN 115.” 

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Similarly, in the latter case of ANENE v. ALABI & ANOR,[6] it was held Per JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, JCA as follows:

“…What is the effect of the absence of the oath? Section13 of the Oaths Act is worded in mandatory terms as it uses the word “shall” which generally speaking is a term of command that implies a mandate. The implication is that an oath is lawful if it is taken before the person set out therein and is in the form set out in the First Schedule to the Act. The converse is that an oath is not lawful if it is not taken before the specified person and in the form set out in the said Schedule. Where the form of the oath set out in the said Schedule is completely absent, there is no affidavit… At page 526, Bage, JCA, as he then was, opined that: “Any written statement which does not bear the First Schedule to Section 13 of the Act, cannot be said to be a written statement on oath. It is only when the declaration of the oath is made that the identity of the maker of the statement can be ascertained. It also serves as to the verification as truth of the statement made therein.” See also GE INTERNATIONAL OPERATION LTD v. Q-OIL AND GAS SERVICES (2015) 1 NWLR (PT. 1440) 244, 270 where Eko, JCA, as he then was, opined that: “In law and common parlance, a written statement that its maker swears to the truth thereof is an affidavit: see Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition a deposition is a witness’s out-of-Court testimony that is reduced into writing for use in Court. It becomes an affidavit if the deponent swears to an oath the declarations made therein are the truth of the matter. By the oath the out-of-Court statement in writing becomes a testimony. It is the oath that gives validity to deposition as a testimony… without the oath, the deposition or written declarations on a piece of paper is a mere piece of paper. The oath makes written declarations or depositions on a piece of paper an affidavit.” Counsel for the 1st respondent argued that the defect in the affidavit was cured by Section 113 of the Evidence Act which provides that: “The Court may permit an affidavit to be used, notwithstanding that it is defective in form according to this Act, if the Court is satisfied that it has been sworn before a person duly authorized.” ?The trial Court held that the affidavit was worthy of being used as the defect therein was cured by Section 113 of the Evidence Act especially as it was sworn before an authorized person. With all due respect, I do not agree with the trial Court. This is because the defect in the affidavit is not a defect in form; rather, it is a total absence of substance and form in that the statement in the First Schedule is completely absent, thus leaving the affidavit with nothing to be cured. The provision of Section 113 of the Evidence Act is intended to cure formal defects and not substantial defects as in this instance. In OBUMNEKE v. SYLVESTER (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 506) 1945,1959-1960, Alagoa, JCA, as he then was, opined as follows: “Thus, every oath to be legitimate must comply with the provisions of the Oath Act, Cap. 333, Laws of the Federation and the First Schedule thereto. Where there is no statement in an oath stating that it is made solemnly, conscientiously believing the contents to be true and correct by virtue of the Oaths Act, it is not an oath or affidavit properly so called and the signature of the Commissioner for Oaths cannot remedy the defect… Failure to comply does not render the document defective in form but in substance and liable to be struck out.” Order 5 Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Edo State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2012, cannot serve as a cure for the fatal defect. The provisions make non-compliance with the Rules an irregularity which does not nullify proceedings. Being rules of Court, it cannot be used to cure a breach of an Act of the National Assembly which ranks much higher than it in the hierarchy of legislation. The affidavit in this matter ought to have been struck out by the trial Court for being incompetent.”

By the pronouncements of the various divisions of the Court of Appeal in the above decisions, it is apparent that the Court refused the use of an affidavit and witness statement on oath because they did not contain the oaths clause as prescribed by Section 13 of the Oaths Act.

However, the same Court of Appeal sought to make a distinction in the case of UDUMA v. ARUNSI[7], where it held as follows:

“There is a distinction between affidavit evidence in procedure begun by originating summons as against statement of witnesses on oath in an election proceeding or proceedings begun by writ. In respect of the latter scenario, where the written statement is to be adopted again on oath by the maker before his cross-examination on it, whatever defect in the original oath in respect of the witness statement has been cured by the second oath made in court before the judex prior to the adoption of the witness statement by the maker and his subsequent cross-examination. [Udeagha v. Omegara (2010) 11 NWLR(Pt. 1204) 168 referred to; Onyejiocha v. Maduako (unreported) Appeals Nos. CA/EPT/54/2008 and CA/EPT/54A/2008 of 14/7/2007 departed from.]”

Similarly, in the case of STANBIC IBTC BANK v. LONGTERM GLOBAL CAPITAL LTD & ORS[8], the Court of Appeal per OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA held as follows:

“The focus of the appellant’s complaint is that the oath does not contain the statutory declaration/conclusion statement: “I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing same to be true in accordance with the Oaths Law”. The appellant persisted that the statutory declaration, as enjoined by Section 11 of the Oaths Law, is mandatory and its absence rendered the oath incompetent. I have, in a bid to pacify the law, visited the record at the abode of the CW1’s Oath which occupies pages 21 – 33, volume 1, of the record, I have subjected the 40-paragraph oath to a merciless scrutiny. Unarguably, the oath, at its twilight, is void of the conclusion statement outlined above. The idea of offering evidence by dint of written statement on oath is a budding/green regime in adjudication. It is a method which grants witnesses the liberty to testify by deposition. Deposition signifies “a statement of a witness made under oath out of Court… Depositions are all matters of procedure as they are adjectival in nature and content”, see Buhari v. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 at 377 and 378, per Tobi, JSC. Indubitably, the admissibility of evidence, of all species, is regulated by the Evidence Act. In Buhari v. INEC (supra), the contest circled around the validity and admissibility of oaths/depositions of witnesses. Tobi, JSC, incisively, outlined four instances that will make an oath inadmissible, namely: if it is sworn before (a) a person on whose behalf the same is offered, (b) his legal practitioner, (c) a partner, (d) a clerk of his legal practitioner. It flows from this ex cathedra authority, a written statement on oath will be inadmissible if it is afflicted with any of the four negative elements adumbrated above. It is not in doubt that the oath of the CW1, which is sought to be expelled, is not plagued by any of these negative elements as to drain it of its validity and admissibility. That is not all. The selfsame Oaths Law makes allowance for omission or irregularity as to oath under Section 4 thereof. In Section 4(2) (b) and (c), it provides: (2) No irregularity in the form in which an oath is administered or taken shall – (b) invalidate proceedings in any Court; or (c) render inadmissible evidence in or in respect of which an irregularity took place in any proceedings. ?It is a recognized canon of interpretation of statutes that provisions of any legislation are not to be subjected to fragmentary interpretation. Put simply, mutually-related provisions of any statute should be married together and given holistic construction in order to garner the intention of the law maker, …. In due allegiance to the injunction of the law, I have given a communal/conjunctive reading to the mutually-related provisions of Sections 4 (2) (c) and 11 of the Oaths Law. It is my humble view that the provision of Section 4(2) (c) neutralizes the mandatoriness of the provision of Section 11 of the Oaths Law. Put bluntly, Section 4 (2) (c) douses the effervescent operation of Section 11 of the Oaths Law. That is to say, any irregularity in the form of an oath will not be fatal to the administration of oath under Section 11 of the Oaths Law. It follows that the CW1’s oath will be salvaged under the saving shelter of Section 4(2) (c) of the Oaths Law. The absence of conclusion statement is drained of the potential to ruin the CW1’s oath or smear it with an indelible incompetence which will snowball into its inadmissibility. The oath of CW1 is not marooned in the murky ocean of inadmissibility on the footing of the lack of the conclusion statemsent/declaration thereon. On the contrary, I am compelled by the salvaging provision of Section 4(2) (c) of the Oaths Law, to crown the CW1’s oath with the deserved toga of competence and validity. I am dispossessed of any justification, in law, to ostracize the CW1’s written statement on oath of 16th May, 2013. I welcome it to this appeal. I accord a wholesale affirmation to the lower Court’s impeccable finding on its competence.”

See also the case of CRC CREDIT BUREAU LTD v. LONGTERM GLOBAL CAPITAL LTD & ANOR (2021) LPELR-55674(CA) Per OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA (Pp 55 – 59 Paras C – C).

Whilst the Court took the rigid stance in the GTB and ANENE’s cases (supra), to the effect that a witness statement on oath without an oath clause is incompetent and ought to be struck out, the same court, differently constituted, took a more liberal approach in the cases of Stanbic IBTC and Uduma cases (supra) to hold that once a person adopts his witness statement on oath in the open court, any defect as to form is cured by the latter oath taken upon adoption.

It is important to note that all the above decisions, and others like them delivered prior to 2022 were all Court of Appeal decisions, which by our hierarchy of Courts do not sound a note of finality on the point. These conflicting decisions had further confused the issues leaving practitioners to pick the authority that suits the position they are canvassing in court.

As for the trial courts, the position to take remained unsettled since it is trite that where a lower court is faced with two conflicting decisions of a higher Court, particularly the Supreme Court, the court is bound to follow the decision that is latter in time. See Osakue v. FCE (Technical) Asaba.[9]

Where however a trial court is faced with two conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal, a trial High Court may pick and choose which of the decisions is closest to the peculiar facts of the case before it and apply same.[10] In the case of ONWUMELU v. DIRI,[11] the Court of Appeal held thus:

“Where a lower Court is confronted with conflicting decisions of a superior court, while the inferior court cannot sit on appeal over decisions of a superior court, the inferior court is nevertheless accorded a right to make a choice between the conflicting decisions.”

Interestingly, the same Court has equally held that where the Court of Appeal is faced with two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court can pick and choose which of the two decisions to follow.[12] In the case of G.T.B. PLC v. FADCO IND. LTD,[13]  it was held that:

“The Court of Appeal is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court but where the Court of Appeal is faced with two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal is allowed to choose which to follow between the two decisions.”

In the writer’s humble view and considering the above judicial authorities therefore, it would seem that the validity of an affidavit and a witness statement alike, without an oath clause has remained unsettled for a long time. These uncertainties may, according to Sidi Bage, JCA (as he then was), mean that the absence of the oath clause is a fundamental defect that goes to the root of the deposition and cannot be treated as a mere irregularity.

 

DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN AFFIDAVIT AND A WITNESS STATEMENT ON OATH

It is not strange to find practitioners take the rules applicable to affidavit and witness statements on oaths as one and the same. Whilst it is conceded that they share many things in common, they however have some latent differences which make drawing a distinction between them, inevitable.

First, by virtue of Item 23 in the Exclusive Legislative List in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution[14], “evidence” is under the Exclusive List in the Nigerian Constitution. As such, only the National Assembly has the legislative competence to make laws regarding it.[15] Thus, the Evidence Act, 2011[16], an Act of the National Assembly regulates affidavit evidence.

Witness statements on oath on the other hand are a creation of/regulated by rules of the various courts.[17] They evolved upon the departure from the era when witnesses give their entire testimonies orally while the Judges take them down in long hand. The frontloading system, in sum, brought about witness statements on oath.

Second, as a general rule, an affidavit constitutes evidence on its own without the necessity of calling the maker to give evidence. This is however not the case with witness statements on oath, whose evidential value is only activated when the deponent, on oath, adopts it in the open court.[18] In the case of Hon. Fabian Okpa v. Chief Alex Irek & Anor, Ndukwe – Anyanwu, JCA, the Court relying on the case of Akpokemovo v. Aga[19] held as follows:

“This Court has consistently held that a witness Statement on Oath is different from an Affidavit evidence. An affidavit is a statement of fact which the maker or deponent swears to be true to the best of his knowledge. It is a Court process in writing deposing to facts within the knowledge of the deponent. It is documentary evidence which the Court can admit in the absence of any unchallenged evidence…. On the contrary, a witness statement is not evidence. It only becomes evidence after the witness is sworn in Court and adopts his statement. At this stage at best it becomes evidence in Chief. It is therefore subjected to Cross-Examination after which it becomes evidence to be used by the Court. If the opponent fails to Cross-Examine the witness, it is taken as the true situation of facts contained therein.”[20]

Similarly, in the case of MEGAMOUND INVESTMENT LTD & ANOR v. OMOTOSHO & ANOR,[21] it was held thus:

“Section 80 and 90 do not cover witness statement on Oath but Affidavit evidence. The most glaring similarity between affidavits (which are regulated by the Evidence Act) and Witness statement on Oath regulated by Rules of Court is only the Oath to be sworn before a commissioner for oaths. They are however two different processes. The statement becomes evidence only upon adoption during examination in chief and not before that. An affidavit does not have to be adopted in examination in chief before it can be relied upon as evidence. It is evidence on filing. See HON. FABIAN OKPA V. CHIEF ALEX IREK (2012) LPELR- 8033 (CA) where the Court distinguished between a statement on oath and an affidavit in the following words: “This Court has consistently held that a witness statement on oath is different from an affidavit evidence. An affidavit is a statement of fact which the maker or deponent swears to be true to the best of his knowledge. It is a Court Process in writing deposing to facts within the knowledge of the deponent. It is documentary evidence which the Court can admit in the absence of any unchallenged evidence. Akpokeniovo vs. Agas (2004) 10 NWLR pt 881 page 394. On the contrary, a witness statement is not evidence. It only becomes evidence, after the witness is sworn in Court and adopts, his witness statement. At this stage at best it becomes evidence in chief. It is thereafter subjected to cross examination after which it becomes evidence to be used by the Court. If the opponent fails to cross examine, the witness, it is taken as the true situation of facts contained there in.” See also BARR. IHUOMA E. UDEAGHA & ANOR V. MATTHEW OMEGARA & ORS. (2010) LPELR-3856(CA), UDUMA V. ARUNSI (2010) LPELR – 9133 (CA).”

 

Thus, it is therefore settled law that although an affidavit and a witness statement on oath are both sworn declarations before a person commissioned to give oaths in Nigeria, the rules applicable to them are different.

THE RECENT SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION

The Supreme Court of Nigeria recently stepped into resolving this age long controversy to determine the validity or otherwise of a witness statement on oath which was argued to be incompetent for failure to have the oaths clause. This was in the case of ADEJUGBE v. ADULOJU.[22] The facts of the case were that the Plaintiff at the trial court commenced an action against the defendants before the High Court of Ekiti State. The defendants filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine the matter on two grounds, to wit; failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action and incompetence of the witness statement on oath for allegedly being offensive to section 13 of the Oaths Act. The Plaintiff, in an attempt to save his case, filed an application to amend his processes before the trial Court but the trial court in ruling on priority of application decided to take the preliminary objection on jurisdiction first. In its ruling, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s case.

On appeal to the court of appeal, the decision of the trial court was upturned and case was restored to the cause list of the trial court for trial before another judge.

Being dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal decision, the Appellant contended before the Supreme Court that the witness statement on oath of the Plaintiff did not contain a verbatim statement of the oath in the Schedule of the Oaths Act. The apex court, per Agim JSC, relying on its previous decisions in the cases of Anatogu v. Iweka II[23] and Solola v. State[24] held that the absence of the oaths clause in the witness statement on oath does not invalidate the oath. The Court held that once the deposition is made before a person authorized by law to take oaths, the absence of an oath clause will not vitiate the oath. The court stated as follows:

“Let me consider the arguments of both sides on non-compliance with S.13 of the Oaths Act and the form in the 1st schedule thereto by the 1st respondent’s written statement on oath that accompanied the writ of summons.

 

The Court of Appeal correctly held that the absence of the words in the form in the 1st schedule to the Oaths Act or similar words in a written statement on oath sworn before a Commissioner for oaths is a mere irregularity as to form that cannot vitiate it. S. 13 of the Oaths Act provides that-

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“It shall be lawful for any Commissioner for Oaths, Notary Public or any other person authorized by the Act to administer oaths to take any and receive the declaration of any person voluntarily making the same in the form set out in the first schedule.”

The first schedule to the Oaths Act prescribe the oath thusly-

“I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I make the solemn declaration conscientiously, believing same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act.”

Affidavits and other forms of written statements on oath usually contain this declaration as prescribed in the form in the first Schedule of the Oaths Act or similar words in the last paragraph. In our instant case, the only written statement on oath that accompanied the writ of summons and statement of claim did not contain the said declaration or any words to the like effect. But the 1st respondent who made the statement stated at the beginning of the statement that he was making the deposition therein on oath and the Commissioner for Oaths endorsed at the foot of the statement that it was sworn at the Registry of the High Court at Ado-Ekiti on 22-11-2011 before him.

Since the statement was made on oath and sworn before the Commissioner of Oaths, the absence of the declaration that was made conscientiously, believing same to be true and correct or like words in the written statement on oath becomes a mere irregularity or defect as to form that has no effect on the validity of the oath and the statement on oath.”[25]

Furthermore, the Court stated that the law is that any defect as to form does not vitiate an oath made before an authorized person in law, even if there was declaration contained in the deposition. It further held:

“Generally, the law does not allow the form of an oath or affirmation to vitiate the oath or statement made under the oath or allow the absence of oath or affirmation to prevent the admissibility of evidence that should be on oath. So where a statement, such as the 1st respondent’s statement in this case, was made on oath and sworn before the Commissioner for Oaths, the absence of the declaration prescribed in the Oaths Act that the deponent made the statement conscientiously, believing same to be true and correct or like words in the written statement on oath becomes a mere irregularity or defect as to form that has no effect on the validity of the oath and the statement on oath.”[26] 

More importantly, the Court held that no law precludes a witness from adopting a statement on oath even if it was not made on oath or sworn at all. The Court, at pages 158-159, paras. B-B; 168, paras. E-G, held thus:  “Section 4(2) of the Oaths Act states that  no irregularity in the form in which an oath or  affirmation is administered or taken shall:

(a) invalidate the performance of official duties; or

(b)invalidate proceedings in any court; or

(c) render inadmissible evidence in or in respect of which an irregularity took place in any(c)proceedings.

While by section 4(3) of the Act, the failure to take an oath or make an affirmation and any irregularity as to the form of an oath or affirmation shall in no case be construed to affect the liability of a witness to state the truth. In this case, even if the 1st respondent’s written statement was not made on oath or sworn at all, it would still be valid as the witness written statement intended to be given or given as evidence on oath in the proceedings and nothing precludes the witness from adopting it as his testimony when testifying on oath in examination in chief in open court. [Anatogu v. Iweka II (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 415)547Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460 Sule v. State (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 545 referred to; Buhari v. I.N.E.C. (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 546 referred to and distinguished.]”

In simpler terms, the Supreme Court might be understood to be holding in this case that the oath taken by the witness upon entering a witness box cures whatever defects as to form, that may exist in the deposition. This holding, in the writer’s view is a welcomed development as it de-emphasizes blind adherence to the dictates of procedural law at the painful expense of doing substantial justice to the parties’ dispute presented before the court. Little wonder that the Supreme Court berated the conduct of the learned trial judge who clearly in this case preoccupied himself with determining procedural issues, disguised as jurisdictional issues, whilst allowing the substantive case suffer for the eleven (11) year journey to the Supreme Court before it is being returned to the trial court for retrial before another Judge.[27]

CONCLUSION

In interrogating this question, it is heartwarming that our courts are maintaining their intolerance for technical justice, which in most cases defeats the merits of the cases before them. It is absurd, in the writer’s opinion, if in 2022, you find a witness statement of oath being held to be incompetent merely because it did not carry a paragraph of oath clause, when it was indeed deposed to before a person authorized to take oaths of that kind.

From the decision of the Court in ADEJUGBE v. ADULOJU (supra), it is settled without doubt that a witness statement on oath without an oath clause is nevertheless valid and can be competently adopted to become evidence before a Court. It however remains unclear if this principle can be stretched to include affidavits, which as has been shown earlier in this article, are fundamentally different from a witness statement on oath. Whilst it is convenient to assume that by parity of reasoning, the decision might apply, one can only hope that a suit fought on affidavit evidence (i.e., commenced by originating summons) gets up to the Supreme Court soon enough, affording the judex an opportunity to clarify the validity or otherwise of the affidavit.

The courts ought to stay true to ensuring that substantial justice triumphs over technical justice.  It is the writer’s view, that no sworn declaration should at this day and age is declared void merely because an oath clause that does not belie the other contents of the document is absent.

 

[1]Abdulkabir Badmos, is a Senior Associate with Mahmud & Co., Abuja-Nigeria. He may be contacted via aabadmos08@gmail.com.

[2](2012) 2NWLR (PT.1284) 285 (CA) at 308 Paras B-E; Luna C.O.P. Rivers State (2018) 11 NWLR (PT.1630) 269 (SC) at 290 Para A.

[3] Section 10, Oaths Act Cap O1, LFN 2004.

[4]Ezeudu v. John (2012) 7 NWLR (PT.1298) 1 (CA) at 15 Paras A-B

[5] (2017) LPELR-42551(CA) Pp 32 – 32 Paras B – F.

[6] (2021) LPELR-56025(CA) Pp. 18 – 23 Paras C – C.

[7] (2012) 7 NWLR (PT.1298) 55 at Pp. 97-98, paras. G-A.

[8] (2021) LPELR-55610(CA) Pp 64 – 68 Paras E – E.

[9] (2010) 10 NWLR (PT.1201)  1 at P. 34, paras. B-C.

[10] NGUN v. MOBIL PRODUCING NIG UNLTD (2013) LPELR-20197(CA) Per JOSEPH TINE TUR, JCA (Pp 31 – 32 Paras C – D)

[11] (1997) 10 NWLR (PT.525) 377 at 405-406, PARAS H-B, Per ACHIKE JCA.

[12] EBITEH v. OBIKI (1992) 5 NWLR (243) 599 at 618, para H, Per ADIO JCA

[13] (2007) 7NWLR (PT. 1033) 307 at 325, para H,

[14] Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

[15] Section 4 (2) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

[16] CAP E14, LFN 2004.

[17] Order 2 Rule 2 (2) (c) of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018; Order 5 Rule 2 (c) of the Lagos State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019.

[18] ONWUFUJU v. OROHWEDOR (2020) LPELR-50767(CA) Per ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, JCA (Pp 35 – 39, Paras F – E)

[19] (2004) 10 NWLR (pt.881) p.394

[20]  (2012) LPELR – 8033 (CA)

[21] (2017) LPELR-50170(CA) Per YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, JCA (Pp 13 – 14 Paras B – E.

[22] (2022) 3 NWLR (PT.1816) 131.

[23] (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 415)547.

[24] (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460.

[25] At page 157 PARAS B-H.

[26] At Pp. 158, para. A; 167-168, paras. H-A.

[27] Op. cit. See dictum of Agim, JSC at pages 160-162, Paras F-A.

The Concept Of Training Compensation And Solidarity Mechanism In Football | Omole Damilare

In the summer of 2017, one of the best players in the world : Neymar Da Silva Santos Júnior popularly known as Neymar Jr moved from Football Club Barcelona to Ligue 1 outfit Paris – St – Germain for a record breaking sum of €222m. The news was all over the media with many fans of the sport shocked at the humongous amount that was paid for his signature. A release clause that was hitherto thought impossible to trigger had finally being paid and following the regulations laid down by the Rules on Status and Transfers of Players (RSTP), the Catalan club had to release one of their best players for that amount. The news of the money was all up in the media with  a minor detail left out of the equation, the solidarity payments that was to be made to Santos : Neymar former club and trainer by Paris- St- Germain which amounted to over €9m.[1]

Solidarity payments are those that occur when a football player is still in contract but is transferred between two clubs belonging to different associations l.e a case of  international transfer. Clubs pay transfer fees, and up to five percent (5 %) of this fee is withheld to be used as the solidarity payment. These payments would then be made and distributed to all clubs that trained the player between his 12th and 23rd birthdays at a proportional rate developing on how long the player was at each club. Also, when a player signs his first professional contract, there is a sort of training money known as training compensation that is paid to the club that was involved in the player’s training.These monies are divided into two different Categories by FIFA : Training compensation and Solidarity mechanisms.

These principles were introduced due to Clubs complaints to UEFA and FIFA over the Bosman ruling which gave footballers more control over their transfers and gave the Clubs less power. Players could decide to wait out their contract and transfer to other clubs and the Clubs involved in their training would not get a dime out of the fees with no hope of recouping the money spent on training these players. [2]The need to maintain Player control and also give clubs  the opportunity to make profit on players training necessitated the need for Training Compensation. In FIFA circular 079, FIFA explained the reason for the Inclusion of rules guiding training compensation and Solidarity mechanism

The new regulations create a detailed system for the payment of training compensation. This system is designed to encourage more and better training of young football players, and to create solidarity among clubs, by awarding financial compensation to clubs which have invested in training young players. At the same time, care has also been taken to ensure that the amounts of training compensation do not become disproportionate, and unduly hinder the movement of young players”

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They went further to state : ” The new club concerned is to distribute 5% of this compensatory amount to all the clubs where this player has played between the age of 12 and 23. This distribution of monies is meant as a solidarity contribution to the clubs involved in the training and education of the player.”

Training Compensation

Training compensation can be paid when a player signs his first professional contract as a footballer and whenever he is transferred up until his 23rd birthday. Either a paid transfer or a free one, the training compensation is mandatory. Only exceptions are spelt out in Annexe 4, act 2 ,Section 2 :

  1. the former club terminates the player’s contract without just cause (without prejudice to the rights of the previous clubs); or
  2. the player is transferred to a category 4 club; or
  3. a professional reacquires amateur status on being transferred.

This exception for category 4 clubs is due to the fact that they are extremely low clubs already and  it would be extremely hard to fork out enough money to serve as training compensation for any club.

In Annexe 4, art 3, Section 1. it states that once a player signs his first professional deal with a club, the Club with whom he signed the deal has to pay training compensation to every football Club/ academy who was involved in his training as a footballer within 30 days of the registration ( clubs hardly follow the 30 days rule though).

In it’s words :  “On registering as a professional for the first time, the club with which the player is registered is responsible for paying training compensation within 30 days of registration to every club with which the player has previously been registered (in accordance with the players’ career history as provided in the player passport) and that has contributed to his training starting from the calendar year of his 12th birthday. The amount payable is calculated on a pro rata basis according to the period of training that the player spent with each club. In the case of subsequent transfers of the professional, training compensation will only be owed to his former club for the time he was effectively trained by that club.”

Section 3 further makes provisions for cases whereby the football club has liquidated or ceased to exist, the money is to paid to the Football Association of that country where the club is located and the money directed towards youth development in that country. For example, a player trained by the now defunct Stationary Stores Club of Lagos who has now ceased to exist, the money will then be paid to the Nigerian Football Federation (NFF) who in turn would make invest the money into youth training and development in that country.

According to Art 4 section 1, football associations are also to divide their clubs into four different categories in accordance to the clubs training investments in youth development. The pre -determined sums are supposed to resemble the amount needed to train one professional player for one year multiplied with what FIFA/RSTP calls the “player factor” l.e the ratio of players trained in order to produce a successful player. Once these club category has been set, the training compensation is  calculated and gotten by multiplying the years which the selling club(s) trained and developed the player.

In 2019, FIFA in Circular No 1673  provides this chart to indicate what compensation may involve according to the respective confederation and the respective category. This chart was to be updated later.

Confederation Category I Category II Category III Category IV

AFC              USD 40,000 USD 10,000 USD 2,000

CAF               USD 30,000 USD 10,000 USD 2,000

CONCACAF    USD 40,000 USD 10,000 USD 2,000

CONMEBOL     USD 50,000 USD 30,000 USD 10,000 USD 2,000

OFC                    USD 30,000 USD 10,000 USD 2,000

UEFA                  EURO 90,000 EURO 60,000 EURO 30,000 EURO 10,000

The above chart illustrates the amount payable to these clubs under those continental federations. Worthy of note us that only UEFA and CONMEBOL clubs have Category 1 clubs.

Also, to make sure players between the age of 12 and 15 are not set at ridiculously high costs, the training compensation will be based on the training costs of Category 4 clubs. For example, if Tunde was trained from 12- 15 at a Category 2 club in Africa and then transferred to a category 1 club, it will be calculated thus : 4×2000 USD for his 12- 15 birthday and then 4× 30,000 USD Setting the total money at 128,000 USD.

Also, although there is not an obligation according to the RSTP to pay training compensation when a professional player transfers domestically, some National Football associations have transfer regulations that make training compensation payable for domestic transfers.

Solidarity mechanism.

Another way by which FIFA allows clubs to also make money from player sales and Transfers is through solidarity payments. Solidarity payments are those that occur when a football player is still in a contract but is transferred between different jurisdictions. When a player is being transferred and the transfer fees are paid, 5% of the transfer fees are held by the clubs and then distributed to all the clubs involved in his training between his 12th and 23rd birthdays at a rate depending on how long he stayed at those clubs. This is without including the training compensation paid to his club already.

This is spelt out explicitly in article 21 of the RSTP: ” when professional is transferred before the expiry of his contract, any club that has contributed to his education and training shall receive a proportion of the compensation paid to his former club (solidarity contribution). The provisions concerning solidarity contributions are set out in Annexe 5 of these regulations.

Annexe 5 of the RSTP further provides the rate of the solidarity payments as follows :

  1. a) Calendar year of 12th birthday: 5% of 5% of any compensation
  2. b) Calendar year of 13th birthday: 5% of 5% of any compensation
  3. c) Calendar year of 14th birthday: 5% of 5% of any compensation
  4. d) Calendar year of 15th birthday: 5% of 5% of any compensation
  5. e) Calendar year of 16th birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation
  6. f) Calendar year of 17th birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation
  7. g) Calendar year of 18th birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation
  8. h) Calendar year of 19th birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation
  9. i) Calendar year of 20th birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation
  10. j) Calendar year of 21st birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation
  11. k) Calendar year of 22nd birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation
  12. l) Calendar year of 23rd birthday: 10% of 5% of any compensation

Just like Training compensation, Solidarity payments are obligatory when an international transfer takes place. However, football associations have regulations that also make it payable in cases of local transfers.

Also dissimilar with the training compensation, Solidarity payments does not stop and continue every time the a player is transferred either on a regular or loan basis. It is also dependent on a fee so free transfers do not count and it is only activated when a player transfers before the end of his contract for a fee. Training Compensation and Solidarity payments have helped a lot of Clubs stay afloat as it helps to bring a substantial sum of money in especially for clubs who have invested a lot in training a player and ensuring the success of his professional career.

The Writer, Omole Damilare is a 200 level student of the faculty of Law, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba Akoko and a sports enthusiast. He can be reached via +2349020837174 or Omoledamilare093@gmail.com

[1] Jonathan.J, (2017,Sep 4), PSG will pay Santos €9m in solidarity money from Neymar transfer – chief : https://www.espn.com/soccer/santos-fc/story/3204253/psg-will-pay-santos-9m-in-solidarity-money-from-neymar-transfer-president

[2] Euspen.A, ( 2022, Mar 31), Training compensation and solidarity mechanism: https://www.easportslaw.com/news/training-compensation-and-solidarity-mechanism

Dear Lawyers, Don’t Miss This Exclusive Hangout

Dear Lawyers, Don’t Miss This Exclusive Hangout

On the 29th of October, 2022 at 11.00am, a group of lawyers will be a part of an exclusive “Lawyers Hangout” holding at Park Inn by Radisson, Victoria Island Lagos.

Asides from the opportunity to network, there will be panel sessions on Law Firm Management, Technology and trends and also on content creation, some of the topics many lawyers have questions on.

A financial expert will also be available to help lawyers navigate their finances.

Other side attractions are Refreshments, Games and lots of networking activities.

To get more information on this event, visit @legallyYes on IG

Here is the link to register

Please make payment and register today on https://selar.co/z6xr  to secure a seat as we have limited seats  available.

Please contact +234 8149990849 for more details. (WhatsApp only ).

See you there.

Proudly sponsored by Legalnaija

See fliers below

Meet The Faculty At The Entertainment Law Training: Nkechukwu Otike-Odibi

Meet The Faculty At The Entertainment Law Training: Nkechukwu Otike-Odibi

Nkechukwu Otike-Odibi is currently the Senior Legal Executive, EbonyLife Media and has led the Legal department of the Company from 2020 till present. She obtained her LL.B from the prestigious University of Benin (UNIBEN) and her LL.M degree with a certificate in Entertainment Law from the University of Southern California (USC).

Her career path has seen her advice on a number groundbreaking international co-production and licensing deals with Netflix, Sony and Westbrook amongst others.

She was also instrumental in the research done for the Harvard Business School case study on EbonyLife Media, the first HBS case study on an African company led by a female entrepreneur. She is passionate about the African entertainment space and educating entertainment practitioners on the workings on the entertainment industry.

TRAINING OVERVIEW

Theme: Entertainment Law Mastery

MODULES

  1. a)Music Contracts & Agreements
  2. b)Film & media Agreements
  3. c)Negotiation & Dispute Resolution
  4. d)Talent Acquisition & Management
  5. e)Licensing & the Film Business
  6. f)Etiquette & public speaking

 

MEMBERS OF FACULTY

  1. Beverly Agbakoba-Onyejianya (Partner, Olisa Agbakoba Legal)
  2. Akinyemi Ayinuoluwa (Partner, Hightower Solicitors)
  3. Fola Alade (Partner, FOTEFA Partners LP/ Mediation Academy)
  4. Oyinkansola Fawehinmi (Foza) (Founder/President, DMCE.)
  5. Yeye Bush (Lead Etiquette Consultant, Manners Matter)
  1. Nkechukwu Otike – Odibi (Senior Legal Executive, EbonyLife Media)

 

DATE–29th and 30th September, 2022

TIME– 9.00am – 5.00pm Daily

REGISTRATION

Register for either the physical or virtual sessions.

Physical Session:
Fee: 70,000 Naira
Early Bird: 50,000 Naira (ends 7th Sept, 2022)
Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3znIb4w
Venue: NECA House, Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos

Virtual Session (ZOOM)
Fee: 50,000
Early Bird: 30,000 (ends 7th Sept, 2022)
Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3CbB6Y9

Get 10% Off the virtual session when you use the code: LEGAL9JA

PAYMENT DETAILS

Lawlexis International Limited

Fidelity Bank

4011176564

Participants will receive a certificate of participation.

NOTE: All payment and delegate information should be sent to lawlexisinternational@gmail.com before the date of training for proper registration. For more information and confirmation of payment, kindly contact us on 09029755663.

Meet The Faculty At The Entertainment Law Training: Akinyemi Ayinoluwa

Meet The Faculty At The Entertainment Law Training: Akinyemi Ayinoluwa

Akinyemi Ayinoluwa is a Partner and Co-founder at HighTower Solicitors and Advocates. His music law practice focuses on the representation of recording artists, songwriters, record producers, record labels, investors in music, and talent managers.  He is often recommended as a lawyer who breathes, drinks and eats music. Akinyemi’s past legal experience includes: Associate at Wemimo Ogunde & Co and Awokoya & Co.

Prior to qualifying as a lawyer, he was a songwriter, recording artist, composer and performer; he was the lead singer of the defunct 100 degrees boy band.  He has authored numerous articles in the field of music law, estate planning, commercial transactions, and regularly gets invited to deliver speeches and courses about these subjects.

Specialties: Intellectual Property Law- contract negotiation in TV industry, music, Production contracts, Recording contracts, Artiste Management deals, Synchronization deals,  Talent negotiations, endorsement deal negotiations, trademarks, music publishing, Debt Recovery, and Reputation Management.

On a small number of clients, Akinyemi functions as a business manager, as well as the lawyer. In recent years, Akinyemi has built up a formidable roster of producer clients from Afrobeats: Masterkraft, Blaq Jerzee, Northboi, Rexxie, Magicsticks, Jaypizzle, and many others. Akinyemi Ayinoluwa prides himself in helping clients understand the value of their intellectual property rights and to be mindful of the exploitation that is rampant in the industry.

TRAINING OVERVIEW

Theme: Entertainment Law Mastery

MODULES

  1. Music Contracts & Agreements
  2. Film & media Agreements
  3. Negotiation & Dispute Resolution
  4. Talent Acquisition & Management
  5. Licensing & the Film Business
  6. Etiquette & public speaking

 

MEMBERS OF FACULTY

  1. Beverly Agbakoba-Onyejianya (Partner, Olisa Agbakoba Legal)
  2. Akinyemi Ayinuoluwa (Partner, Hightower Solicitors)
  3. Fola Alade (Partner, FOTEFA Partners LP/ Mediation Academy)
  4. Oyinkansola Fawehinmi (Foza) (Founder/President, DMCE.)
  5. Yeye Bush (Lead Etiquette Consultant, Manners Matter)
  1. Nkechukwu Otike – Odibi (Senior Legal Executive, EbonyLife Media)

 

DATE–29th and 30th September, 2022

TIME– 9.00am – 5.00pm Daily

REGISTRATION

Register for either the physical or virtual sessions.

Physical Session:
Fee: 70,000 Naira
Early Bird: 50,000 Naira (ends 7th Sept, 2022)
Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3znIb4w
Venue: NECA House, Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos

Virtual Session (ZOOM)
Fee: 50,000
Early Bird: 30,000 (ends 7th Sept, 2022)
Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3CbB6Y9

Get 10% Off the virtual session when you use the code: LEGAL9JA

PAYMENT DETAILS

Lawlexis International Limited

Fidelity Bank

4011176564

Participants will receive a certificate of participation.

NOTE: All payment and delegate information should be sent to lawlexisinternational@gmail.com before the date of training for proper registration. For more information and confirmation of payment, kindly contact us on 09029755663.

 

Meet The Faculty At The Entertainment Law Training: Fola Alade

Meet The Faculty At The Entertainment Law Training: Fola Alade

Fola Alade is a Notary Public and an Accredited Attorney- Mediator based in Lagos. He is the Founder/ Principal Partner at FOTEFA PARTNERS LP (MEDIATORS & MEDIATION ADVOCATES), a bespoke Mediation firm in Nigeria

Fola Alade is a Fellow, World Mediation Organization (WMO), Mediator of the Global Mediation Panel at the Office of the Ombudsman for United Nations Funds and Programmes, a Certified Mediation Advocate with the Standing Conference of Mediation Advocates (U.K), a trained Mediator on the Panel of Neutrals of the Federal High Court(FHC), Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse (LMDC), Edo State Multi- Door Court House(EMDC), Lagos Court of Arbitration (LCA) and Lagos Chamber of Commerce and International Arbitration Centre (LACIAC), a trained Negotiator from the Lagos Business School (LBS), a Certified Emotional Intelligence Specialist and a Certified Trainer(International Award in Delivering Training[IADT] UK) with the London Professional Training Centre.

He is the Founder/Principal of Fotefa Mediation Academy, another bespoke Mediation Training Academy where he trains on the business and practice of Mediation. He is also the Executive Director of the Incorporated Trustees of Attorney-Mediators Association (ATMA), a Consultant/Facilitator/Trainer with the Standing Conference of Mediation Advocates (SCMA Nigeria), Betaworka Cosmopolitan Partners Limited, Au Courant Legal Research Firm, Legally Engaged Academy and the Resource HQ Ltd where he trains on Negotiation, Mediation, Mediation Advocacy, Workplace Conflict and Emotional Intelligence.

He was a Judge at the 8th Edition of the 2TG-RMLNLU International Mediation Competition and the 17th Edition of the International Commercial Mediation Competition.

Fola was called to the Nigerian Bar in 2007 after obtaining his LLB Hons Degree from the University of Lagos in 2006. He is a member of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and the Section on Business Law (SBL), Lagos Court of Arbitration (LCA) and a Partner member with the NCMG International (Negotiation and Conflict Management Group International).

TRAINING OVERVIEW

Theme: Entertainment Law Mastery

MODULES

  1. a)Music Contracts & Agreements
  2. b)Film & media Agreements
  3. c)Negotiation & Dispute Resolution
  4. d)Talent Acquisition & Management
  5. e)Licensing & the Film Business
  6. f)Etiquette & public speaking

 

MEMBERS OF FACULTY

  1. Beverly Agbakoba-Onyejianya (Partner, Olisa Agbakoba Legal
  2. Akinyemi Ayinuoluwa (Partner, Hightower Solicitors)
  3. Fola Alade (Partner, FOTEFA Partners LP/ Mediation Academy)
  4. Oyinkansola Fawehinmi (Foza) (Founder/President, DMCE.)
  5. Yeye Bush (Lead Etiquette Consultant, Manners Matter)
  1. Nkechukwu Otike – Odibi (Senior Legal Executive, EbonyLife Media)

 

 

DATE–29th and 30th September, 2022

TIME– 9.00am – 5.00pm Daily

REGISTRATION

Register for either the physical or virtual sessions.

Physical Session:
Fee: 70,000 Naira
Early Bird: 50,000 Naira (ends 7th Sept, 2022)
Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3znIb4w
Venue: NECA House, Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos

Virtual Session (ZOOM)
Fee: 50,000
Early Bird: 30,000 (ends 7th Sept, 2022)
Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3CbB6Y9

Get 10% Off the virtual session when you use the code: LEGAL9JA

PAYMENT DETAILS

Lawlexis International Limited

Fidelity Bank

4011176564

 

Participants will receive a certificate of participation.

NOTE: All payment and delegate information should be sent to lawlexisinternational@gmail.com before the date of training for proper registration. For more information and confirmation of payment, kindly contact us on 09029755663.

Become An Entertainment Law Expert

Become An Entertainment Law Expert

Become An Entertainment Law Expert By Learning From Award Winning Entertainment Lawyers (Career Training For Lawyers; Hybrid Session)

According to statistics, this year total revenue in the Nigerian Entertainment industry is projected to reach US$4.77m. Furthermore, a PwC report forecasts that the fast-growing industry will earn $14.8bn in 2025.

As Nigeria’s media and entertainment industry continues on its growth path, it urgently requires more lawyers who understand the business and the laws that apply to entertainment law.

Lawlexis has put together a stellar faculty of award winning entertainment lawyers and experts to provide participants with a clear mastery of the entertainment industry, and how lawyers may make more impact and take advantage of the opportunities therein.

Modules for this training include;

– Music Contracts & Agreements

– Film & media Agreements

– Negotiation & Dispute Resolution

– Talent Acquisition & Management

– Licensing & the Film Business

– Etiquette & public speaking

 

The Members of Faculty include;

– Beverly Agbakoba-Onyejianya (Partner, Olisa Agbakoba Legal)

– Akinyemi Ayinuoluwa (Partner, Hightower Solicitors)

– Nkechukwu Otike-Odibi, Senior Legal Executive at EbonyLife Media

– Fola Alade (Partner, FOTEFA Partners LP/ Mediation Academy)

– Oyinkansola Fawehinmi (Foza) (Founder/President, DMCE.)

– Yeye Bush (Lead Etiquette Consultant, Manners Matter)

 

Other details are:

Theme: Entertainment Law Mastery

Date : 29th & 30th September, 2022

Time: 9am – 5pm daily

Registration:

  1. Physical Session:

Fee: 70,000 Naira

Early Bird: 50,000 Naira (ends 7th Sept, 2022)

Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3znIb4w

Venue: NECA House, Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos

Virtual Session (ZOOM)  

Fee: 50,000

Early Bird: 30,000 (ends 7th Sept, 2022)

Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3CbB6Y9

Persons who should attend include lawyers and stakeholders in the entertainment industry at all levels. If you want a successful practice in Entertainment law and business, you may not come across such unique opportunity to learn from these lineup of experts again.

For enquiries, please contact:  Lawlexis  – lawlexisinternational@gmail.com or 09029755663

Termination Of Contracts In The Football World |  Omole Damilare Fisayo

Termination Of Contracts In The Football World |  Omole Damilare Fisayo

In the 2021/2022 January transfer window, Gabonese striker, Pierre-emerickAubameyang secured a move from English Premier League team, Arsenal Football Club to FC Barcelona on a free/bosman transfer. Despite the details of the move being sketchy, Arsenal Football Club reportedly paid seven million pounds to the former African footballer of the year to terminate his contract.[1]Also, Spanish giants, Football Club Barcelona have been attempting a summer overhaul with an aim to reduce the amount of players on the club’s payroll. These players are deemed surplus to requirement due to them not being considered important enough to be on the club’s wage bill as the club embarks on what seems to be a rebuild.

In light of these, it would be Important to analyze termination of footballers contract and what it entails. Can a club terminate a player’s contract unilaterally? Can a player terminate his own contract unilaterally? What happens when a player wants out of a club, and the club doesn’t want to release him? These questions and many more will be scrutinized below.

What is a contract?

Before going deep into what termination of contracts mean, it is important for the definition of contracts and its significance in football to be discussed.

According to the Cornell Law School,” a contract is an agreement between private parties creating mutual obligations enforceable by law.  The basic elements required for the agreement to be a legally enforceable contract are: Mutual consent, expressed by a valid offer and acceptance, adequate consideration; capacity and legality. Contracts are promises that the law will enforce. If a promise is breached, the law provides remedies to the harmed party, often in form of monetary damages, or in limited circumstances, in the form of specific performance of the promise made”.[2]

The importance of contracts in football and sports in general cannot be overstated. It is one of the basic principles on which sports is founded. For example, when a local athlete decides to participate in a track event, likely a 100 meter sprint in return for a particular reward which might be monetary or in the form of medals. A contract has taken place between both sides as there is an offer, acceptance, consideration and legal enforceability as it is a commercial transaction. This is also applicable to football, whereby a team of agrees to participate in a competition for a reward. However, I will not be speaking on these types of contracts as they are not the focus of this paper. Top level football contracts are more multifaceted than these simple agreements. Football in recent years has become a commercially viable source of income for a lot of people: club owners, footballers, football agents, corporate bodies and brands, sportswear and kit brands and even lawyers.

The football transfer market is a global one with the English Premier League alone having a net spend of €893m in the 2021/2022 Summer transfer window.[3] These Incredible developments have also introduced a lot of intricacies in the sport and the way contracts are being signed and established in the sport. Agents and clubs have to negotiate for a lot of things, from salaries to the Image rights of a particular player.

However, when a player doesn’t find the club attractive anymore or doesn’t adapt to a club’s playing style, what does he do? What if he decides to leave a club in search of a bigger club or a new challenge? The simple way is to offer himself to clubs and hope a club deems him valuable enough to pay a transfer fee for him.

Also what happens when a club does not have need of a footballer services anymore? This leads us to the main topic of termination of contracts in football.

What is Termination of Contract?

Simply put, contract termination is the lawful ending of a contract before that contract is completed. It can be done by one of the parties for different reasons, it can also be due to a termination clause in a player’s contract, an issue concerning the payment of wages of a player, medical grounds, gross misconduct on the part of the player, criminal offenses, lack of playing time and many other reasons.

The position of the law is clear on termination of contracts between players and football clubs. The rules guiding these activities are outlined in Article 13 – 17 of the Regulations on Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) 2016.

Article 13 of the RSTP expressly provides that:“A contract between a professional and a club may only be terminated upon expiry of the term of the contract or by mutual agreement.” [4]

This is the regular procedure for terminating a football contract, when a term ends or when the two parties (player and club) come together to end the contract mutually. However, as this is not always the case and to also protect both parties interest and rights, there are exceptions to this rules which are stated in other Articles.

Article 14 allows for the termination of a footballer’s contract provided the party that wishes to terminate the contract has a “just cause” to do so. In its words:

1. Contract may be terminated by either party without consequences of any kind (either payment of compensation or imposition of sporting sanctions) where there is just cause.

  1. Any abusive conduct of a party aiming at forcing the counterparty to terminate or change the terms of the contract shall entitle the counterparty (a player or a club) to terminate the contract with just cause[5]

 

The phrase “just cause” is very important as it forms the basic crux of many legal disputes and judicial battles between footballers and clubs. This phrase is classified into two main parts: “financial just cause” (nonpayment of salaries) or “sporting just cause” (appearances and playing time of players).

This is explained further in article 14:

  1. In the case of a club unlawfully failing to pay a player at least two monthly salaries on their due dates, the player will be deemed to have a just cause to terminate his contract, provided that he has put the debtor club in default in writing and has granted a deadline of at least 15 days for the debtor club to fully comply with its financial obligation(s). Alternative provisions in contracts existing at the time of this provision coming into force may be considered.
  2. For any salaries of a player which are not due on a monthly basis, the pro-rata value corresponding to two months shall be considered. Delayed payment of an amount which is equal to at least two months shall also be deemed a just cause for the player to terminate his contract, subject to him complying with the notice of termination as per paragraph 1 above.
  3. Collective bargaining agreements validly negotiated by employers’ and employees’ representatives at domestic level in accordance with national law may deviate from the principles stipulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. The terms of such an agreement shall prevail.

In summary, the article provides that a player can terminate his contract provided he is owed by the club in which he plies his trade if he is being owed for a particular amount of time depending on the basis he is being paid, either weekly or monthly. In cases whereby a player is paid weekly or based on the hours he uses at work, two months equivalent of that salary would be deemed enough as a reasonable and just grounds to terminate his contract.

This particular law been tested many times. For instance, in 2018 former Cameroonian International, Alex Song, left his former club, Rubin Kazan, after FIFA intervened and his contract terminated due to the club’s inability to pay its players’ wages. It was stated that the player was being owed 7.9 million pounds by Rubin Kazan.[6]

Also worthy of note is the case of OmoleyeTosin and Eyimnba Football Club where the footballer where the Footballer was able to terminate his contract with the club in line with Article 14 of the rules on the status and transfer of players (RSTP). His lawyer, T.C Ujah, LLD on behalf of SportHouse LP wrote:

“Under the extant laws and regulations, particularly the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the current circumstances of the treatment meted out to our Client together with the refusal and failure to pay his monthly salaries and financial entitlements (now over two months) constitute just cause for the termination of the playing contract, for which Enyimba Football club is liable.

“TAKE NOTICE, therefore, that our Client hereby formally terminates his contract with Enyimba Football Club, effective immediately.[7]

Article 15 also provides for termination of contracts due to “sporting just cause “, It explicitly states that:

An established professional who has, in the course of the season, appeared in fewer than ten per cent of the official matches in which his club has been involved may terminate his contract prematurely on the ground of sporting just cause. Due consideration shall be given to the player’s circumstances in the appraisal of such cases. The existence of sporting just cause shall be established on a case-by-case basis. In such a case, sporting sanctions shall not be imposed, though compensation may be payable. A professional may only terminate his contract on this basis in the 15 days following the last official match of the season of the club with which he is registered”.[8]

Article 15 provides players with the ability to terminate their contract for “sporting just cause” where they have played in less than 10% of their club’s fixtures in the relevant season.  This allows a player to join another club without fear of the potential sporting sanctions that may be imposed upon them for a breach of contract without just cause.

The article is guided by the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) in the landmark decision of O. v. FC KryliaSovetovSamara .[9]

The concept of the “established professional ” needs to be considered not only on the basis of the player’s age but also on the basis of “his sporting level as demonstrated during his career, in terms of an acceptable standard in the light of the specificity of the sport, the player’s legitimate expectations and what is expected of the player in terms of sporting performance.

The participation by a player in more or less than 10% of the official matches played by his club is calculated by reference to the number of matches in which the player played, but also according to the time he was on the field. A player cannot rely on Article 15 if he has not notified his club during the season of his dissatisfaction with the fact that he is not actively participating in the team’s games.[10]

Worthy of note is that this particular process is usually full of complications as the phrase “just cause” has to be defined in a case by case basis by FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) or an arbitration panel.

Also, it is important to note that a contract cannot be unilaterally terminated by one party during the course of a season. This is in accordance with Article 16 of the RSTP. Both parties have to come to a mutual agreement such as in the case of Pierre-emerickAubameyang and Arsenal Football Club.

Article 17 of the RSTP further states the consequences of terminating a player’s contract without “just cause”

“All cases, the party in breach shall pay compensation. Subject to the provisions of article 20 and Annexe 4 in relation to training compensation, and unless otherwise provided for in the contract, compensation for the breach shall be calculated with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport, and any other objective criteria. These criteria shall include, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortized over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. It then lays down a set of rules guiding the calculations contained in this particular article”[11]

In Daniel Geey“Done deal, an insider guide to football contracts, multi million pound transfers and Premier League business” hesays : “there has have been a number of cases in relation to this issue. Although perhaps not as widely known as Bosman, the cases of Andy Webster, Matuzalém and DeSanctis are examples where FIFA and CAS decided on the money paid to the player’s former club (payable jointly by the new club and the player). In the case of Webster, it was decided that only a small amount of compensation should be payable to the former club. This was calculated as £150,000, which was the remaining wages that Webster was owed by his old club. However, in the cases of Matuzalém and De Sanctis, CAS ruled that significantly more compensation should be paid to the former club. Matuzalém, and the club to which he transferred, were ordered to pay almost €12m, a sum calculated in relation to his transfer value and wages. Similarly, DeSanctis and his new club were ordered by CAS to pay €2.2m, which included taking into account the cost of finding two replacement goalkeepers.”[12]

Termination of contracts in the Nigerian scene is yet to be fully explored due to the administrative problems and epileptic nature of the League. A lot of professional footballers are cheated out of their contracts with no proper compensation. Some are kept in contracts that exploit them with many not even paying footballers salaries for months leaving the footballers to beg for what is due to them. Although there are cases in which these rules has been enforced, most times clubs get away with exploiting these players. A popular example is that of OmoleyeTosin and Eyinmba Football Club where the footballer was able to terminate his contract with the club in line with Article 14 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) as earlier stated.[13]

In conclusion, termination of contracts is a very important albeit risky part of the football business at it can make or mar a footballer career and also allow lengthy legal disputes which could result in heavy sanctions for defaulting players. It is therefore advisable to find solutions to avoid these issues.

 

The writer, Omole Damilare Fisayo is a 200 level student of the faculty of law, AdekunleAjasin University, AkungbaAkoko, Ondo state, Nigeria. He is a sports law enthusiast. He can be reached via +2349020837174 or his email: Omoledamilare093@gmail.com.

 

 

 

 

[1] Pierre-EmerickAubameyang: Arsenal confirm striker leaves by mutual consent ahead of Barcelona move. (2022, february 2), sky sports https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.skysports.com/amp/football/news/11670/12530228/pierre-emerick-aubameyang-arsenal-confirm-striker-leaves-by-mutual-consent-ahead-of-barcelona-move.

[2]Contract, retrieved from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/contract#:~:text=A%20contract%20is%20an%20agreement,consideration%3B%20capacity%3B%20and%20legality.

[3] Premier League spending table: Arsenal finish top as Chelsea make profit (2021, September 1).

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.footballtransfers.com/en/transfer-news/uk-premier-league/2021/08/which-premier-league-club-has-spent-most-money-2021/22/amp

[4] Regulations on Status and Transfer of Players, (RSTP), Article 13, (2022, July)

[5]  Regulations on Status and Transfer of Players, (RSTP), Article 14, (2022, July)

[6]Michealseares, (2018, June 24) “Ex-Arsenal player Alex Song is owed £7.9m by Russian club Rubin Kazan who will host World Cup quarter-final”. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-5879549/amp/Ex-Arsenal-player-Alex-Song-owed-7-9m-Russian-club-Rubin-Kazan.html

[7]TundeEludini, (2022, February 2), Nigerian player terminates contract with Enyimba over alleged unpaid salaries https://www.premiumtimesng.com/sports/football/509294-nigerian-player-terminates-contract-with-enyimba-over-alleged-unpaid-salaries.html

[8]  Regulations on Status and Transfer of players, (RSTP), Article 15, (2022, July.

[9] O. v. FC KryliaSovetov Samara, CAS 2007/A/1369.

[10] Squire Battonboggs, (2016, October, 2016), Bastian Schweinsteiger and termination for sporting just cause. https://www.sports.legal/2016/10/bastian-schweinsteiger-and-termination-for-sporting-just-cause/#:~:text=He%20has%20terminated%20his%20employment,of%20the%202016%2F2017%20season.

[11] Regulations on Status and Transfer of players, (RSTP), Article 17, (2022, July)

[12]Daniel G, (2019), done deal: An Insider’s Guide to football Contracts, multi-million pound transfers and premier league big business. Bloomsbury publishing.

[13]TundeEludini  (2022, February 2), Nigerian player terminates contract with Enyimba over alleged unpaid salaries https://www.premiumtimesng.com/sports/football/509294-nigerian-player-terminates-contract-with-enyimba-over-alleged-unpaid-salaries.html

Signing Of Court Processes And The Need For A Departure From The Law In Okafor v. Nweke |  Daniel Adedigba

Signing Of Court Processes And The Need For A Departure From The Law In Okafor v. Nweke |  Daniel Adedigba

Let me start with a quick analysis of the Law in Okafor v Nweke (2007) LPELR-2412 (SC). In simple terms, the law which has formed the basis of an age – long judicial precedence is that where any Court process is signed in the name of a law firm as opposed the name of the legal practitioner, the entire proceeding based on the process shall be null and void.

The rationale is that such processes are irregular and amounts to nothing in the face of the law. The Supreme Court has fortified this position in numerous cases such as MTN (Nig.) Ltd v. C.C. Inv. Ltd (2015) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1459) 437/465, SLB Consortium Ltd v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 312, Peak Merchant Bank v. NDIC (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1261) 253, among others.

In the interest of Justice, it is time to revisit the judicial precedence in Okafor v Nweke as the law has occasioned grave injustice and non-departure will keep strengthening technicalities – an irony to the purport of the Law, the Court and our Judicial system.

In the case of Solumade & Ors v. Kuti & Ors (SC/327/2010), decided on the 11th June 2021, the suit lasted for over 23 years from the trial court to the Supreme Court. The Respondent in this case expended 23 years in a quest for Justice only for the Appellant to raise it at the first time at the Supreme Court that processes filed in the year 1998 were irregular and consequently, the litigation journey of 23 years was nothing but an exercise in futility, null and void.

Similar situation was the fate of the case of Aya v. Nkanu & Anor (SC/940/2015) also decided on the 11th June 2021. The respondent litigated its matter for a duration of 9 years only to be confronted with an objection at the Supreme Court on the ground that an originating process filed 9 years ago was signed by a law firm as opposed to a legal practitioner called to the Nigerian Bar.

The consequence, among others, of the judicial precedence in Okafor v Nweke, is huge distrust in our judicial system – perhaps how can a litigant repose confidence in a system where an objection sourced from a 23 years old irregularity throw his case into the judicial dustbin. This precedence makes resources expended in the pursuit of justice nothing but sheer futility and makes mockery of Justice.

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The Supreme Court has consistently echoed the need to pursue Justice over technicalities. In the case of Veepee Industries Ltd v. Cocoa Industries Ltd (2008) 4-5 SC (Pt 1) 16, the Supreme Court admitted the need to depart from previous decisions if consistent adherence will occasion injustice on the path of a party and result in a complete destruction of the right of access to Court.

Rule 5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a non-lawyer shall not form partnership with a lawyer in the practice of law. It is then technicalities taken too far to hold that a law firm is not called to the Nigerian Bar and a process signed by a law firm can crumble a proceeding at any time even if raised at the Supreme Court.

If this issue is to be treated with an iron hand, I think it should be a procedural irregularity which should be raised timeously and not one capable of vitiating a well-conducted proceeding.  Continuous adherence to the law in Okafor v Nweke will defeat the very strong rationale of the Supreme Court in holding that the error of a counsel should not be visited on a litigant. It will consistently obstruct justice while elevating technicalities and above all, lead to loss of confidence in our Judicial system.

 

Daniel Adedigba is a Legal Practitioner based in Abuja, Nigeria

adedigbadaniel01@gmail.com

+2348108019481

Become An Expert Entertainment Lawyer

Become An Expert Entertainment Lawyer

Career training programs prepare you for a job in a specific field, and this training is preparing lawyers for their role in the Nigerian entertainment industry.

According to statistics, total revenue in the Nigerian Entertainment industry is projected to reach US$4.77m in 2022. Furthermore, a report from consultants at PwC forecasts that the fast-growing industry will earn $14.8bn in 2025. No doubt the Nigerian entertainment industry is a big deal globally and with high revenues come legal issues and discussions.

According to Yahaya Maikori, the role of lawyers in the entertainment industry includes, but not limited to general counsel of the client, education, advocacy, advisory services, brand protection and management services.

We have put together a stellar faculty of award winning entertainment lawyers and experts to provide lawyers with a clear mastery of the entertainment industry and how to take advantage of the opportunities therein.

Modules for this training include;

1. Music Contracts & Agreements

2. Film & media Agreements

3. Negotiation & Dispute Resolution

4. Talent Acquisition & Management

5. Licensing & Intellectual Property

6. Etiquette & public speaking

The Members of Faculty include;

– Beverly Agbakoba-Onyejianya (Partner, Olisa Agbakoba Legal)

– Akinyemi Ayinuoluwa (Partner, Hightower Solicitors)

– Fola Alade (Partner, FOTEFA Partners LP/ Mediation Academy)

– Oyinkansola Fawehinmi (Foza) (Founder/President, DMCE.)

– Yeye Bush (Lead Etiquette Consultant, Manners Matter) .

Other details are:

Theme: Entertainment Law Mastery

Date : 29th & 30th September, 2022

Venue: NECA House, Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos

Time: 9am – 5pm daily

Registration Fee: 70,000 Naira | 50,000 Naira (early bird – ends 15th September, 2022)

Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3znIb4w

Participants who should attend include lawyers and stakeholders in the Entertainment industry at all levels. If you want a successful practice in Entertainment law and business, you should make sure you are in this room on Training Day.

For enquiries, please contact: 

Lawlexis

09029755663

lawlexisinternational@gmail.com