2019 Election Petitions:The Judiciary can help Sanitize Nigerian Electoral System.  | Raymond Nkannebe; Esq.

2019 Election Petitions:The Judiciary can help Sanitize Nigerian Electoral System. | Raymond Nkannebe; Esq.

With the limitation period for the presentation of petitions flowing from the just concluded Presidential and National Assembly elections having closed a fortnight ago, and those of gubernatorial and Houses of Assembly elections closing on the 1st of April, 2019 save for states and local constituencies where supplementary elections were held on the 23rd of March, 2019, it is safe to conclude that the politicians have had their day under the proverbial sun, and have now passed the ball into the court of the judiciary who must now get to work in the next one year at least to determine the catalogue of petitions that have proceeded  from the womb of the 2019 elections which in many ways brought to full glare and national embarrassment, the weakness of our electoral process. So bad was it, that some segment of the civil society posit that it is arguably the worst election to have been conducted in Nigeria since the dawn of uninterrupted democracy in 1999.

Contrary to the situation in 2015, the victory of president Muhammadu Buhari is today a subject of litigation. Whereas former president Goodluck Jonathan made the now famous phone call to his opponent candidate Muhammadu Buhari when it became crystal clear that he was on the wrong side of the ballot, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar rightly or wrongly depending on the individual’s political bias, has decided to challenge the re-election of Muhammadu Buhari in court.
In a 147-page petition filed on his behalf by a battery of very senior and distinguished members of the bar, Atiku and his Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), are asking that the result of the election as announced by the electoral umpire, INEC be nullified, and their candidate returned. According to them from what one gathers from the well laid out petition, on a proper computation of results from the polling units, it was the PDP and their candidate Atiku Abubakar, and not Muhammadu Buhari who won the election. They have made a heavy weather of having evidences which support this proposition particularly the smart card reader data from all the polling units across the country transmitted to INEC’s back-end server during the course of the polls. 
Beyond Atiku’s petition, a staggering  736 petitions challenging one election or the other, have been received by the election petition tribunals inaugurated by the acting Chief Justice of Nigeria, Tanko Muhammad, two weeks before the conduct of the election. This number understandably could increase as the final collation of results by INEC in Rivers state last week, has seen some candidates and their political parties angling to challenge the return of incumbent Governor Nyesom Wike.
The climate of rigging and manipulation of election results in Nigeria added to the undue militarization of the electoral process by the incumbents who are often in control of the security apparatus often necessitates the challenge of  elections by Petitioners on a number of grounds that have been laid down by the electoral law namely, that the person whose election is being challenged was not qualified to contest the election ab initio; or that the winner of the election did not score the majority of lawful votes cast at the election. Others are that the questioned election is invalid by reason of corrupt practices or non-compliance with the provisions of the Act; or that the Petitioner was validly nominated but was unlawfully excluded from contesting in the election by the electoral umpire. See section 138(1) )(a-d) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).
It is however not in the fleshing out of the grounds of the petition and the particulars in support of same that the Petitioners often run into a problem but in the leading of evidence to establish to the required degree of proof, the often serious allegations contained in most petitions such that could eventuate into a return of the petitioner by the tribunal as was recently seen in the Osun state election petition tribunal which nullified the victory of incumbent governor Gboyega Oyetola in favour of Senator Ademola Adeleke. This writer however understands that decision is a subject of appeal at the Court of Appeal sitting in Abuja.
A holistic appraisal of the election petitions that have made their way to our courts and/or election tribunals as far back as the cases of Omoboriowo v Ajasin (1984) 1 SCNLR 108; Obih v Mbakwe (1984) LPELR-2712 (SC); Nwobodo v Onoh (1984) 1 SC 1; Buhari v INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120); Ojukwu v Obasanjo (2006) (EPR) 242 to name a few, will readily reveal the near impossibility of upturning an election through the courts. A petitioner almost always finds himself contending with a large body of case law and statutory provisions that literally excuses and/or explains away the electoral infractions complained of in his petition. Save for a handful of cases where a petitioner was returned through the tribunals, thousands of petitions go to court at every election cycle without any success. Perhaps the circumstances of the 2007 general election puts the difficulties faced by a petitioner in proper context. Despite the winner of that very controversial election acknowledging that the process which brought him to power was fraught with widespread irregularities and gross manipulation of the electoral process, it is ironical to say the least, that the challenge of that election at the presidential election tribunal by then General Muhammadu Buhari came to nought. Such is the lot of the Petitioner.
The sad consequence(s) of this is that it has helped to fester the culture of rigging across board. The Nigerian politician having understood how difficult it is to upturn an election through the courts, has devised even more brazen and disingenuous means of rigging him or herself into power and thereafter, dare their opponent to go to court to challenge the victory. Anyone who has had the privilege of studying the electoral forms from our shambolic elections will readily come to terms with the fact that elections in Nigeria are basically a riggers affair. It is the candidate who is able to out-rig the other through any means whatsoever that is often declared the winner thus making a mockery of our democracy.
In a bold attempt however to improve the sanctity and integrity of our electoral process and to the credit of former chairman of the electoral commission Alhaji Attahiru Jega, the smart card reader was introduced in the 2015 general election to checkmate the recurrent problem of multiple accreditation of voters against the spirit of the voters register. The genus of the smart card reader machine was to ensure that only bio-metrically accredited voters could cast valid ballots at the polling booths. It was thought that it would solve the recurrent problem of multiple thumbprinting by unscrupulous elements who lend themselves to politicians who prostitute the electoral process.
But the legality of the smart card reader as an instrument for the conduct of elections was to evolve into a serious constitutional debate on the back of the petitions that made it to the election tribunals following that round of elections. In the case of Nyesom v Peterside (2014) 5 NWLR (pt. 1430) 377 a full-bench of the apex Court despite acknowledging the motive behind the introduction and use of the card reader machine in an election, which needless to say was to bolster the democratic norm of  “one man one vote”, went ahead to strike it down for having derived its efficacy from the INEC guidelines which obviously was in conflict with section 49(2) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) which nominates the voters register as the instrument of accreditation of voters and proof of over-voting by a person challenging an election.
In answering the question whether failure to use card reader for accreditation of voters can invalidate an election, the apex Court Per. AKA’AHS held instructively as follows, “the introduction of the card reader is certainly a welcome development in the electoral process. Although it is meant to improve on the integrity of those accredited to vote so as to check the incidence of rigging, it is yet to be made part of the Electoral Act. Section 138(2) envisages a situation where the Electoral Commission issues instruction or guidelines which are not carried out. The failure of the card  reader machine, or failure to use it for the accreditation of voters cannot invalidate an election. The section provides as follows: “138(2) an act or omission which may be contrary to an instruction or directive of the Commission or of an officer appointed for the purpose of election but which is not contrary to the provisions of this Act shall not of itself be a ground for questioning the election”. 
With the above sentiments of the apex Court, many of the petitioners who went to court in the last cycle of election hoping to make a case out of the non-use of the smart card readers in the accreditation of voters at the polling units found themselves on the wrong side of the law, and severally paid with a dismissal of their petitions. Unfortunately, none of the petitioners drew the attention of the apex Court to the amendment of section 49 (2) of the Electoral Act which was signed into law by former president Goodluck Jonathan on the 20th of March, 2015, just 8 days before the holding of the general election. On their part too, the judex did not take judicial notice of this amendment to the principal Act which legitimized the use of the smart card reader for voter accreditation; the very basis upon which the Court upheld all the disputed governorship elections conducted by the INEC on April 11, 2015. 
Having said that, the 2019 elections and the petitions trailing it, provides another window of judicial activism for the judiciary which has the potency of revolutionizing our electoral process and by extension, our nascent democracy. With the countrywide criticisms that have greeted the conduct of the just concluded general elections ranging from selective use of the smart card reader machines in some places and the outright thumbprinting of ballot papers in the quarters of party chieftains and what not, in a barefaced prostitution of our electoral process, suffice it to say that the ball is effectively in the Court of the judiciary to rise up to the occasion in ensuring that not a single illegal vote counts in the return of a candidate. 
A simple way to do this, is to ensure the fulsome recognition of the data from the smart card reader machines and using same as a benchmark for reconciling the total votes cast in a polling unit so as to check against over-voting which was perpetrated by politicians with reckless abandon in the just concluded 2019 elections. In places where the smart card reader machines malfunctioned and thus were not used, the tribunals must ensure that the procedure enumerated by the electoral umpire on how voters in such polling units should cast their votes, was applied to the latter. Anything otherwise, must of necessity lead to the cancellation of the results from such unit as consecrated by the relevant provision of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), and the Guidelines of the electoral commission 2019. 
Instructively, the apex Court in the Nyesom v Peterside case (supra) acknowledges that the innovation of the smart card reader machines was well intentioned in that, it was calculated to improve the integrity of our elections. The petitions that are now lying before the several election petition tribunals across the country, provides an opportunity for the judex to uphold  the smart card reader machine and lend it the much needed judicial imprimatur which counted against its usage in the last cycle of elections, irrespective of the consequences for the individual poll where it is applied.
At a time when it has been shown that the executive and the legislature are enmeshed in a dark conspiracy to the detriment of our democracy, such as was seen in the circumstances under which assent to the Electoral Act Amendment Bill (2018) was refused by president Muhammadu Buhari, the judiciary can step in, in its hallowed capacity as the avowed defender of any democracy to sanitize our electoral system.  This is what Nigerians who are increasingly losing confidence in our electoral process earnestly asks of the judiciary.
Raymond Nkannebe; a legal practitioner writes from Lagos.
Pigeon-holing the Ground of Non-qualification of a Party Candidate in Pre and Post-Election Matters |Prince Ikechukwu Nwafuru

Pigeon-holing the Ground of Non-qualification of a Party Candidate in Pre and Post-Election Matters |Prince Ikechukwu Nwafuru

In
election petition and pre-election litigation, it is common to see lawyers and
litigants go off on a tangent on the issue of qualification of a person for
election to various offices, by introducing into their processes, internal party
issues and non-constitutional criteria. And this is notwithstanding the express
provisions of the Constitution on the qualification for political positions.  It is either the Petitioner is alleging that
the Respondent was not properly nominated by his/her political party and as
such is not qualified to contest the election in the first place, or the
Respondent in his Reply to the Petition, is setting up a defence of lack of
locus standi of the Petitioner on the ground that the nomination of the Petitioner
is invalid. 

In both scenarios, arguments have been made to the effect that it
is wrong to raise the issue of political party primaries at the Election
Tribunal or to challenge the qualification of a party candidate outside the
precinct of the Constitutional provisions. Pursuant to the principle of
internal party affairs, neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent is in a
position to challenge the outcome of the Primary Election of the opposing Party
at the Election Petition Tribunal under whatever guise. Several reasons have
been adduced to support the arguments. First, the Petitioner and the Respondent
are not members of the same political party and as such, neither of them has
the locus to challenge the process that led to the nomination of the opposing
party. Even amongst members of the same political parties, the Courts, as part
of the judicial policy on non-interference with domestic affairs of political
parties, have consistently endeavored to narrow the ground upon which party primaries
may be challenged in pre-election disputes, not to talk of a non-member who is
often considered as a stranger and a meddlesome interloper in internal party
affairs.  To drive home this point, in
the case of Frank Okon Daniel v. INEC & ORS (2015) LPELR-24566(SC), the
Supreme Court speaking through His Lordship Rhodes-Vivour JSC posed the
question thus: “Who can question the conduct of primaries?”. The Law Lord
went ahead to answer the question as follows:

“Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act
answer the question. It reads: “87(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of
this Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of
the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a Political Party has not been
complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a Political
Party for election may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a
State or FCT, for redress. This court has interpreted the above section in
recent decisions. In Sylva & 2 Ors v. PDP (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) p.85 I
said that: “….. Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act confers jurisdiction
on the court to hear complaints from a candidate who participated at his
party’s primaries and complains about the conduct of the primaries….” In
Lado v. CPC (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) p.689 Onnoghen, JSC said that:
“…… section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended deals with the
procedure needed for the nomination of candidate by a Political Party for any
election and specifically provided a remedy for an aggrieved aspirant who
participated at the party primaries which produced the winner by the highest
number of votes.” Also in Emenike v. PDP & 3 Ors. (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt.
1315) p. 556, Fabiyi, JSC said: “…… that for a complaint to come
within the narrow compass of sections 87(4) (6) and 87(9) of the Electoral Act
and be cognizable by a court the aspirant must show clearly and without any
equivocation that the National Executive Committee of the Political Party
conducted a primary election in which he was an aspirant and that the primary
election was conducted in breach of specified provisions of the Electoral
Act/Electoral Guidelines. Can the appellant benefit from section 87(9) or did
the appellant participate in the re-run of the PDP held on 15/1/11. In his
affidavit filed in support of his amended originating summons the appellant
deposed in paragraphs 26 and 30 as follows: “26. That in response, I informed
Mr. Akpabio Udo Ukpa that I was not aware and did not participate in the re-run
election. 30. That because of their refusal to inform me, I could not attend
the re-run neither did any of my supporters, as we became aware after it had
been done.” An admission, clearly and unequivocally made is the best
evidence against the person making it. Paragraphs 26 and 30 are conclusive
evidence that the appellant did not participate in the re-run primaries
conducted by PDP on 15th January, 2011. They are clear admissions by the
appellant. Since the appellant did not participate in the re-run primaries
there was no way he could complain about the conduct of the primaries, and so
had no locus standi to institute an action as provided by section 87(9) of the
Electoral Act. Put in another way, before a candidate for the primaries can
have the locus standi to sue on the conduct of the primaries he must be
screened, cleared by his political party and participate at the said primaries.
Anything short of that the candidate who did not participate in the primaries
could conveniently be classified as a meddlesome interloper with no real
interest in the primaries. The Court of Appeal to my mind was wrong. The
appellant has no locus standi to institute this suit because he did not
participate in the re-run primaries.”

The
above excerpt summarizes the principle that only an aspirant who participated in
a party Primary can challenge the outcome of the primaries. If a member of a
political Party who did not participate in the Primaries cannot challenge the
outcome of same, how much more a non-party member? This again, underscores the
need to compartmentalize the ground of non-qualification in election petition
litigation. 

Second
and as a corollary to the first point above, the election petition Tribunal is
not a proper venue to challenge the nomination of a party candidate as it forms
part of pre-election matters which incidentally are now time-bound. Even where
qualification of a party candidate is to be challenged either in pre or
post-election dispute, a bit of circumspection and adroitness is required to
avoid veering off the Constitutional path. In my previous write-up “
Election Petition Litigation: Key Legal
Issues to note”
(https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/election-petition-litigation-key-legal-issues-note-prince-nwafuru/),
I had discussed the nature of challenge to qualification that could support a ground
of election petition. However, in that op-ed I did not mention the provision of
section 138(1)(e) of the Electoral Act. Not that it would have changed my
conclusion in that write-up, but at least to show that the new sub-section has
not changed the position of the law on the vexed issue of qualification of a party
candidate. This follow up is therefore, necessary to demonstrate that the
ground of non-qualification is often misunderstood and misapplied at the
election petition tribunals and in pre-election disputes as well. 

Sub-section
(e) of Section 138(1) of the Electoral Act was introduced following the 2015
amendment that was signed into law by the former President, Goodluck Ebele
Jonathan on 26 March 2015. The sub-section provides that an election may be
challenged on the ground that person whose election is questioned had submitted
to the Commission affidavit containing false information of a fundamental
nature in aid of his qualification for the election. Thus, in addition to the
four traditional grounds upon which an election may be challenged under section
138(1)(a)-(d) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), this new sub-section
seeks to expand the ground on non-qualification by providing that an election
may also be question on the ground that respondent submitted to INEC affidavit
containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his
qualification for the election. The flip side argument would mean that, the
Respondent in an election petition for instance, may rely on this subsection to
challenge the locus standi of the Petitioner to present the Petition on the
ground that the Petitioner submitted affidavit containing false information to
INEC. What this sub-section (e) seeks to achieve is not yet clear considering that
subsection (a) of Section 138(1) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)
already provides that an election may be questioned on the ground that “a
person whose election is questioned was, at the time of the election, not
qualified to contest the election.”  Does
section 138(1)(e) of the Electoral Act, give a litigant at the Election
Petition Tribunal a carte blanche to introduce all sorts of grounds under the
pretext of challenging the qualification of a party candidate? I do not think
so. Again, it is not clear what constitutes “false information of a fundamental
nature in aid of his qualification” as provided in the sub-section. The Courts in
many decided cases have already said that reference should be made to the
Constitution only, in determining the issue of qualification of a person to
elective position. Hence, the constant allegations of forgery of age
declaration certificate, tax clearance documents or academic qualification in a
bid to challenge the qualification of the party candidate thereto need to be
examined vis-à-vis the constitutional provisions on qualification for elective
offices. Whether such issues would fall within the qualification criteria set
out in the Constitution would depend on the facts of each case. For instance in
the case of academic qualification, the Constitution has set the minimum
academic requirement to be that the person must have been been educated up to
at least School Certificate level or its equivalent. The same Constitution
defines “School Certificate or its
equivalent
” to mean (a) a Secondary School Certificate or its
equivalent, or Grade II Teacher’s Certificate, the City and Guilds Certificate;
or (b) education up to Secondary School Certificate level; or (c) Primary Six
School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent and – (i) service in the public or
private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent
National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years, and (ii) attendance
at courses and training in such institutions as may be acceptable to the Independent
National Electoral Commission for periods totaling up to a minimum of one year,
and (iii) the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in the English
language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission,
and (d) any other qualification acceptable by the Independent National
Electoral Commission;

In PDP v. OGAH & Ors (2016) LPELR-40850(CA), the
1st Respondent Dr. Sampson Uchechukwu Ogah sought the
disqualification of Dr Okezie Ikpeazu, the current Governor of Abia State on
the ground that the Governor was not qualified to be the Candidate of the
Appellant (PDP) in the Governorship Election relying on and alleging that the
Form CF001 as sworn to by Dr Ikpeazu in the affidavit accompanying other
documents submitted to Independent National Electoral Commission by him
pursuant to Section 31 (2) of Electoral Act was false. The Court of
Appeal in setting aside the decision of the Federal High Court disqualifying Dr
Ikpeazu, reiterated the principle to the effect that based on the doctrine of
“covering the field” as enunciated in AG. Abia v. AG. Federation
(2001) 6 NWLR Pt. 763 at Pg. 264 at 391 – 392 also in Abia v. AG. Federation
supra, by the Supreme Court, the National Assembly CANNOT make laws with
respect to the qualifications and non-qualifications of candidates for election
into political office.

What is clear from the foregoing decision is that the
issue of qualification of a candidate to stand for an election can only be
decided by making reference to the Constitution
. Section 138(1)(a) and (e) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as
amended) is therefore not a blank cheque to introduce internal party affairs or
any qualification issue not anchored on the provisions of the Constitution in
pre or post-election disputes. Putting it differently, in challenging the
qualification of party candidate at the Election Petition Tribunal or regular Courts,
it is important that the ground of the petition or objection is premised on
those qualifications provided under the Constitution. The Constitution has made
copious provisions for the qualification of persons vying for various elective
positions such as President, Governor, Senator, Member of House of
Representative or Member of a State House of Assembly. For instance, the
Constitution provides that “A person shall be qualified for election to the
office of the President if –(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth; (b) he has
attained the age of forty years; (c) he is a member of a political party and is
sponsored by that political party; and (d)he has been educated up to at least
School Certificate level or its equivalent.

Any
other provision of the Electoral Act or any other law setting different qualifications
for candidate in respect of any elective post in Nigeria is subservient to the
above Constitutional provision and cannot be countenanced. Putting it
differently, any requirements provided by INEC or any other body stipulating
the qualification to contest an elective position in Nigeria must be within the
narrow margin of “all constitutional requirements for election to that
office.” In effect, any extraneous requirements that are squarely outside
the requirements of the Constitution on qualification of a person to an office
cannot ground a reason for disqualification either in election petition
litigation or pre-election matters.



Prince Ikechukwu Nwafuru
Counsel 
Paul Usoro & Co. 

Photo Credit – www.thisdaylive.com 

Decisions Of The National Executive Council, A Lesson In Due Process

Decisions Of The National Executive Council, A Lesson In Due Process

Major decisions that affect
the welfare of lawyers are usually decided by the National Executive Committee
of the Nigerian Bar Association. Though this decisions affect lawyers directly,
quite a number of lawyers are unaware of how decisions are reached by the NBA’s
National Executive Council, while some believe all decisions are made by the
NBA President, more seasoned members of the Bar understand that such decisions
are reached by following due process and the principles of equity.

In order to ensure fairness,
equity and proper administration, the NEC represents all Stakeholders in the Nigerian
Legal Profession. According  to the NBA
Constitution, the NBA NEC is made of the following members;

(a) National Officers;

(b) All past Presidents and
General Secretaries;

(c) All Chairmen and
Secretaries of registered Branches;

(d) One (1) other representative
of each registered Branch;

(e) Chairmen and Secretaries
of Sections;

(f) Other deserving members
of the Association co-opted by the National Executive Committee provided always
that the total number shall not exceed 180 members.

Furthermore, Section 7(6) of
the NBA Constitution provides expressly for how decisions are to be made and it
states clearly that, “consensus shall be the aim of the National Executive
Committee but if it becomes necessary to put any questions to vote, then it
shall be decided by a simple majority, based on a show of hands, provided
however that the National Executive Committee may resolve to decide any
specific issue by secret ballot”.

Recently, the decision of
the NEC removing Mr. Akinlade, the Chairman of the NBA Ikorodu Branch, received
some criticisms by members of the Bar who believed the NBA President, Mr. Paul
Usoro, reached the decision. A position solely, which could not be farther from
the truth.  Mr. Bayo Akinlade, was
suspended as the Chairman of the NBA Ikorodu Branch over what the NEC termed
“gross disrespect and disregard for the bar”.

As evidenced above in the
NBA Constitution, there is a process for reaching decisions at the NEC and same
was duly observed and followed by the Paul Usoro SAN led NBA in the removal of
the NBA Chairman. It is noted that the NBA President has introduced groundbreaking
initiatives into the NBA, especially initiatives bothering on transparency,
good governance and credible leadership. Most definitely the Nation can learn a
lot from the Nigerian Bar Association.

At the last meeting of the
NEC held on the 28th of March, 2019, other issues discussed include
the Rule of Law, the 2019 Election Monitoring reports, illegal harassment of
members of the Bar and the Financial Audit of the NBA among other things.
The NBA President, Paul Usoro SAN continues to be a shinning example on leadership within the Bar. To stay updated on the
amazing work of the NBA and its president, follow the NBA President
@paulusorosan on all your social media platforms or stay tuned to the Legalnaija
Blawg.

@Legalnaija

The Obligation of an Employer to Give a Work Reference | Michael Dugeri

The Obligation of an Employer to Give a Work Reference | Michael Dugeri

Employers quite frequently do seek legal advice on their obligation to give work/employment reference to their employees. While there is no general legal duty to give an employee (or former employee) any reference – positive or negative, recent case law suggests that there is an implied term in contracts of employment imposing a duty on the employer to provide fair and accurate work/employment reference for their employees. There is a potential liability for an employer who provides unfair or misleading reference, which can cause harm to the employee. 

In the case of Kelvin Nwaigwe v. Fidelity Bank Plc (unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/85/2014) the National Industrial Court examined the implied obligation of an employer to give work reference. The Claimant sued his former employer claiming inter alia, a right to work reference. Due to the paucity of local authorities in this area of labour law, the Court turned to the law and practice in similar jurisdictions such as the UK for guidance, and held thus: 
‘I am persuaded by the force of these UK case law authorities that in appropriate cases there is an implied term in contracts of employment imposing a duty on the employer to provide work reference in respect of its employee, whether former or existing. The defendant in the instant case is a Bank and hence a financial institution. This means that the defendant has an obligation to give a work reference to, or in respect of, the claimant, which work reference must be true, accurate, fair and not misleading to a future employer; and I so find and hold.’
Under common law, there was no absolute obligation on employers to provide reference to an employee but case law in the UK has developed a number of exceptions to the common law position. It would now appear that, in certain circumstances, an employee can require an employer to give a reference. UK case law suggests that it may be appropriate in some cases to imply a term into a contract of employment that the employer will provide the employee with a reference at the request of a prospective employer. The basis for this implied term was aptly stated in the case of Malik v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (BCCI) (1997) UKHL 23 where the House of Lords held that Employers must take care not to damage their employees’ future employment prospects, by harsh and oppressive behaviour or by any other form of conduct which is unacceptable today as falling below the standards set by the implied trust and confidence term. 
For clarity and context, some of the UK case laws that were applied in the Nwaigwe case are examined as follows:
In Spring v. Guardian Assurance (1995) 2 AC 296, the plaintiff was dismissed from office by the defendant (an insurance company and hence a financial institution). He got another job which required a work reference from the defendant. The work reference given by the defendant was not favourable, described by the trial judge, Judge Lever QC, as the “kiss of death”. In consequence, the plaintiff lost the new job and so brought an action against his former employer on several grounds including negligent misstatement, malicious falsehood and breach of contract, but not defamation. An action in defamation (but not for the tort of negligence) would have entitled the defendant to the defence of qualified privilege. The House of Lords held that an employer who gives a reference in respect of a former employee owed that employee a duty to take reasonable care in its preparation and would be liable to him in negligence if he failed to do so and the employee thereby suffered economic damage. The House of Lords also held that an implied term of the contract existed between the plaintiff and the defendant to ensure that reasonable care was taken in the compiling and giving of the work reference, and that the defendant was in breach of that implied term.
Lord Slynn in the House of Lords commented that, even if there is no universal duty on an employer to give a reference, it would seem that contracts may exist when it is necessary to imply such a duty. Lord Woolf (as he then was) then attempted to specify the circumstances which would enable such a term to be implied. Those circumstances are: 
a. the existence of the contract of employment or of services; 
b. the fact that the contract relates to an engagement of a class where it is normal practice to require a reference from a previous employer before employment is offered; and 
c. the fact that the employee cannot be expected to enter into a class of employment, except on the basis that the employer will on the request of another employer, made not less than a reasonable time after the termination of the previous employment, provide a full and frank reference to the employer. 
In another UK case, Bartholomew v. Hackney London Borough and Anor (1999) IRLR246, the Court of Appeal held that in giving a reference to a former employee, a former employer owes a duty of care to the former employee to provide a reference which is true, accurate and fair; fairness determined by having regard to the whole of the reference and the surrounding context, as a number of discrete statements, though factually accurate in themselves, could nevertheless read as a whole give an unfair or potentially unfair impression to a recipient of the reference. However, it is not necessary that a reference in every case be full and comprehensive. 
In TSB Bank Plc v. Harris (2000) IRLR 157, a reference provided to a potential employer for an existing employee which disclosed customer complaints unknown to the employee, was found to be a breach of the employer’s duty and was held to be a breach of trust and confidence to disclose complaints to others, if the employee was not given an opportunity to answer them.
And in Cox & Cross v. Sun Alliance Life Ltd (2001) IRLR 448, the Court of Appeal made it clear that the question of whether an employer who provides a reference for a former employee is in breach of the duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the reference is accurate and fair will usually involve making reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of the statements in the reference. The take away from this case is that it is advisable for employers to confine unfavourable statements on employees to those matters into which they have made reasonable investigation and have reasonable grounds to believe are true; and where an investigation is discontinued, unfavourable comments should be confined to matters that were investigated before the employee’s departure. 
As though taking a cue from other jurisdictions such as the UK, the Courts in Nigeria (as in the in the Uwaigwe), have held that an employer is indeed obligated in law to provide an employee with a reference. An employer owes a duty of care against negligent misstatement i.e. not to mislead or misrepresent to the person (usually a potential employer or the employee) to whom the reference is provided. It is submitted that this approach accords more with best practice in labour and employment law.  
In conclusion, sometimes it is best for employers to adopt the position of just providing a statement of service confirming an employee’s length of service and not commenting further. This is known as the “no comment” reference. The other option is to provide a “full disclosure” reference where the employer provides all the relevant details of the employee, including appraisals and potentials, while leaving it to the potential employer to draw its conclusions. An employer cannot be held liable for defamation in providing this type of reference as long as it is made without malice and the information is based on credible evidence. However, it is safer to provide information based on performance appraisals that were counter-signed by the former employee. This will prevent potential liability for negligent misstatements.
Michael Dugeri
Corporate Commercial Lawyer at Austen-Peters & Co.
Mikedugeri@gmail.com 
MTN Nigeria and NBA Lagos Branch Host Corporate Counsel Masterclass

MTN Nigeria and NBA Lagos Branch Host Corporate Counsel Masterclass

As part of its efforts to support capacity building in the legal profession, the Lagos branch of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) in collaboration with the Commercial Legal Department of MTN Nigeria organised a masterclass for lawyers on best corporate legal practices.

MTN Nigeria at its corporate headquarters in Ikoyi, Lagos, hosted the event, which featured a cross-section of senior as well as young lawyers in support of the NBA’s efforts at deepening industry knowledge through the Continuing Legal Education and Mentorship Committee.
Commenting on the masterclass, the company’s Chief Operating Officer, Mazen Mroue stated that the event was yet another testament to MTN’s long term commitment to investing in the country’s human development capacity.
In his remarks, Corporate Relations Executive at MTN Nigeria, Tobechukwu Okigbo said the masterclass “is a strong example of how in-house teams can share best practices with external counsel and we are grateful that we are doing this.”
A foremost corporate lawyer, Ifeoma Utah, who is currently the General Manager, Commercial Legal, MTN Nigeria walked attendees through the rudiments of being a great corporate lawyer. Utilising a variety of in-house case studies and sharing from her wide experience, she expounded on the importance of building critical skill sets in risk management, crisis management, negotiation, matching the right case to the right law firm and being emotionally intelligent.
She also highlighted the increasingly important role of the corporate lawyer as “there is more to being a lawyer than just drafting documents and going to court. You have to be a coach, a financial expert, a business analyst and a star negotiator, among others.”

Tobenna Erojikwe, Chairman of the Continuous Legal Education Committee, Nigerian Bar Association, Lagos Branch and Partner at Law Crest LLP thanked MTN Nigeria for its continued support to the NBA Lagos Branch as the largest corporate supporter of the branch.
The role of a legal practitioner in the administration of justice: can a legal practitioner win or lose a case?|Henry Chibuike Ugwu.

The role of a legal practitioner in the administration of justice: can a legal practitioner win or lose a case?|Henry Chibuike Ugwu.

INTRODUCTION

It has become rampant
to see legal practitioners tout their perceived success rates with regards to
cases they have handled in courts during press interviews, while discussing
with prospective clients, on law office websites etc.

Some lawyers would
even say they have won a certain number of cases, lost others, and drawn a few;
and at other times display graphical or pictorial representations of their
success rates on law office websites and in other publications. This practice
is even more disturbing because renowned and widely celebrated legal
practitioners are also complicit.

The result is that
impressionable lawyers and especially the young wigs have been left with a
notion of law practice that if not corrected may lead to a complete failure of
the administration of justice in Nigeria. This notion encourages a defence
lawyer to believe that it is only when his client is discharged and acquitted
that he has won the case, or a prosecutor to equate conviction of a defendant
to a successful rendition of his legal service. This notion has led many legal
practitioners to do everything possible, including manufacturing evidence,
encouraging perjury, and commission of crimes, in a bid to ensure they get
judgments favourable to their clients.  

DUTY
OF A LEGAL PRACTITIONER IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

The Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal
Practitioners (RPC), 2007
, in expressing the general responsibility of a
lawyer in Rule 1 states that:

A lawyer shall uphold and
observe the rule of law, promote and foster the cause of justice
, maintain
a high standard of professional conduct, and shall not engage in any conduct
which is unbecoming of a legal practitioner. (Underlining mine for emphasis)

Every responsible
lawyer admits that obeisance to the rule of law and fostering the cause of
justice is the most fundamental duty of a legal practitioner. In fact the Court
of Appeal put it better in PCN v. Lamlex (Pharmacy) (Nig.) Ltd. &
Ors
[i]
when it stated as follows:

I need to reiterate the cardinal
principle that counsel are ministers in the temple of justice and should
therefore ensure that they stay on the side of justice at all times. It is the
duty of counsel to present the case of his client to the best of his ability
but the duty and loyalty of counsel does not extend beyond presenting the
client’s case within the law and rule of professional ethics. Counsel owe a
higher duty to the cause of justice.

It therefore follows
that a legal practitioner in rendering services to a client must ensure that he
is within the bounds of the law at all times.  A lawyer is therefore not permitted, during
representation of a client, to aid or participate in any unlawful conduct, to give
advice which he knows is capable of causing breach of the law, and to conceal
any fact or evidence in proof thereof which he knows will aid the
administration of justice, even if such fact or evidence does not support his
case.[ii]
See Obeten
v. State (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 376) 711
and Co-operative and Commerce Bank (Nigeria) PLC. v. Okpala & Anor
(1997) LPELR-6278 (CA)
.

Where, for example, a
client approaches a lawyer and states that he committed an offence and intends
to plead guilty during his arraignment, such a lawyer if he appreciates the
hallowed duty he has in fostering the cause of justice, knows that his duty in
rendering professional services to such a client does not include prompting the
client to enter a plea of “not guilty”, and conjuring facts or employing delay
tactics to frustrate the administration of justice. Abiru J.C.A. in Salihu v. Gana & Ors[iii]
observed instructively that “lawyers who
misuse their knowledge of the law and legal procedure to stultify the process
of administration of justice are a disappointment and constitute a clog to the
progress of the legal profession.”

In a circumstance
where a court of law convicts a defendant flowing from his plea of “guilty”
during arraignment, and upon being satisfied that such a plea is consistent
with the facts of the case, the lawyer who represented such a defendant cannot properly
be said to have lost the case.

In fact, a lawyer
cannot win or lose a case. How could he when the case in the first place was
never his? The Court of Appeal and Supreme have reiterated time and again that
counsel qua advocate is an expert of the law and the facts of the case belong
solely to his client. See Afribank Nigeria PLC v. Homelux Construction
Company LTD & Anor (2008) LPELR-9020 (CA)
and Alhaji Kachalla Musa v. AG Taraba State & Anor (2014) LPELR-24183
(CA)
.

The RPC also
stipulates that “Where an accused person
discloses facts which clearly and credibly show his guilt, the lawyer shall not
present any evidence inconsistent with those facts and shall not offer any
testimony which he knows to be false”.[iv]

A legal practitioner
has the responsibility, as master of law, to give legal advice to his clients
and strictly apply the law to the facts of a client’s case. In circumstances
where it is apparent to a lawyer that his client’s case is frivolous or that
the chances of his client succeeding are extremely remote, he has a
responsibility of informing the client of the uselessness of pursuing such a
course in other to save his client from unnecessary expenses; and to save the
time of the courts. See MAGIT v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi
& Ors (2005) LPELR-1816 (SC)
;
Jegede v. Afe & Anor (2017)
LPELR-43232 (CA)
and Okeke & Ors v. Okoli & Ors (1999)
LPELR-6638 (CA)
.

IMPROPER
ATTRACTION OF BUISNESS

A legal practitioner
shall not engage or be involved in any advertising or promotion of his practice
of the law which makes comparison with other lawyers or includes any statement
as to the size of or success of his practice and his success rate.[v]

The practice by some
lawyers in publicly portraying success rates on the basis of the favourability or
otherwise of court judgments in respect of matters they handle for their
clients is a breach of the rules and etiquettes regulating the conduct of legal
practitioners in Nigeria. It cannot be overemphasized that the delicate nature
of law practice is sober and a responsible lawyer must always contemplate the
duties he owes to his clients, colleagues, the court and most importantly- the
cause of justice, in all his professional dealings.

CONCLUSION  

A legal practitioner
is always successful in the conduct of a client’s case when he devotedly and
dedicatedly applies the law to the facts of his client’s case irrespective of
the ruling or judgment of the court.

Lawyers, and indeed
law students must be reminded that a good lawyer should always be dispassionate
about the facts of cases presented to him by clients. A lawyer is only
permitted in the conduct of a case to be impassioned about the law and legal arguments
he avails a court vis-à-vis the facts of his client’s case. Where this is case,
the lawyer is always successful as his duties transcend the prosecution of a
mere brief from a client but extends to aiding the hallowed courts effect God’s
justice on earth.  

Henry Chibuike Ugwu
Esq
.

Henrycugwu@gmail.com



[i]
(2018) LPELR-44686 (CA) Per Bolaji-Yusuff, J.C.A. (Pp. 32, paras. B).
[ii]
See generally Rule 15, RPC, 2007.
[iii]
(2014) LPELR-23069 (CA).
[iv]
Rule 37(3), RPC. See also Rules 37(4)-(6).
[v]
Rule 39(2)(c) & (d), RPC.